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 People often evaluate their own skills in relation to others’ performance. Two 
experiments examined the influence of peer characteristics on children’s responses to 
upward social comparisons (i.e., peers who outperformed them). In Experiment 1, a total 
of 126 5-, 8-, and 10-year-olds were told that they were outperformed by an expert or 
novice peer on a familiar task and a novel task. Five-year-olds reported high self-
evaluations and expectations of winning a competition regardless of peer expertise and 
task type, and this effect decreased with age. Eight-year-olds reported high self-
evaluations after comparisons to an expert for both task types, whereas 10-year-olds did 
so only for the familiar task. Finally, 8- and 10-year-olds were more optimistic about 
their ability to win a competition after comparisons with a novice than an expert peer, but 
8-year-olds felt this way only for the familiar task and 10-year-olds felt this way only for 
the novel task. In Experiment 2, a total of 98 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds 
were told that the peer had a positive or negative trait that was task-relevant (i.e., 
intelligence) or task-irrelevant (i.e., athleticism). Younger children reported high-self 
evaluations and expectations of winning a competition indiscriminately. Older children 
reported higher self-evaluations and competition expectations after hearing about positive 
rather than negative traits, irrespective of task relevance. This research documents an 
emerging sensitivity to relative failure and peer characteristics in self-evaluation. Taken 
together, the studies provide insight into the development of children’s expertise and trait 
conceptualizations as related, but distinct, competence cues in early to middle childhood. 
  
By middle childhood, children consider whether they were outperformed and who 
outperformed them. These results have implications for understanding how children’s 
self-evaluations can be altered by the way in which teachers and parents frame relative 
failure.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Self-evaluation of performance and abilities has practical importance for 
academic achievement of children (Luo, Kovas, Haworth, & Plomin, 2011; Schunk & 
Pajares, 2002) and adults (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012). Across development, a number of 
factors become influential to self-evaluations, including social feedback (e.g., explicit 
praise and criticism; Kamins & Dweck, 1999). During middle childhood, social 
comparison with peers becomes a particularly salient source of feedback for children’s 
self-evaluations (Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 1980). Specifically, knowledge 
that others have performed better (i.e., upward comparison) or worse (i.e., downward 
comparison) than the self produces systematic decreases and increases in self-
evaluations, respectively. However, these effects can vary based on the information 
available about comparison others (e.g., gender information; Rhodes & Brickman, 2008). 
As children age, they acquire an understanding of many types of social information 
relevant to the interpretation of comparative feedback. The current studies are the first to 
investigate the effects of two developmentally salient characteristics, namely expertise 
(Danovitch & Keil, 2004) and ability related traits (e.g., smartness; Stipek & Daniels, 
1990), on children’s responses to comparative feedback between early and late 
childhood. 
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In the adult literature, theoretical and empirical accounts of social comparison 
suggest that perceived similarity between comparison others and the self is a key factor in 
determining the outcome of social comparison (i.e., whether self-evaluations are 
improved or impaired; Mussweiler, 2001, 2003). Indeed, when adults perceive an upward 
comparison other as similar to the self, self-evaluations are typically positive 
(Mussweiler, 2001). Although there are currently no developmental models of social 
comparison, developmental frameworks of self-awareness highlight that representations 
of others are critical to the development of self-representations. In particular, self-
awareness in a number of areas (i.e., physical features, capabilities, traits, and social 
roles) is linked to the identification of self-other similarities and distinctions, which are 
developed through interactions with others (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). Relevant 
interactions with others may include social comparison experiences that also add to the 
development of children’s self-other representations. Children’s representations of their 
traits and capabilities may be influenced by comparisons with peers in particular, as peers 
serve as salient others in achievement domains as early as the preschool years (Chafel, 
1986). Further, distinctions or similarities between the self and peers are likely affected 
by knowledge about peers’ characteristics (e.g., shared traits may make self-other 
similarities more salient than differences).  
In addition to the increasing salience of peers as a reference group with age, 
children’s reasoning about social comparison develops within a typically optimistic 
context that highlights positive rather than negative attributes. Socialization practices 
related to academics, such as parenting and schooling, are particularly important (for 
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reviews, see Boseovski, 2010, and Cimpian, in press). Parents of preschoolers often 
attribute their children’s academic success to stable abilities, whereas they attribute 
failure to a temporary lapse in effort (Rytkonen, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2005; Stipek & 
MacIver, 1989). Additionally, preschool and early elementary school teachers’ criteria 
for achievement are based on students’ effort and improvement. Conversely, upper 
elementary school teachers are more evaluative and their criteria focus on relative 
performance and meeting normative standards (Blumenfeld, Hamilton, Bossert, Wessels, 
& Meece, 1983; Gullickson, 1985). In line with these achievement criteria, teachers’ 
feedback shifts from the provision of corrective feedback and praise for task completion, 
to the use of normative feedback (e.g., letter grades) and praise based on performance 
outcomes (Stipek & MacIver, 1989).  
Early socialization practices foster the tendency to form and maintain positive 
views of the self and others via disregard of negative information. This optimistic world 
view, termed the positivity bias, is evident beginning at 4 years of age, peaks in middle 
childhood, and attenuates in late childhood (Boseovski, 2010). This documented age-
related change in positivity is expected to be reflected in children’s self-evaluations. 
Specifically, children at the peak of this bias may interpret negative social comparative 
feedback as unrelated to self-evaluations or disregard it altogether. Of relevance to the 
current studies, the positivity bias is also known to affect children’s reasoning about 
expertise (Boseovski & Thurman, 2014) and ability related traits (e.g., smart: Benenson 
& Dweck, 1986).    
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Current perspectives on the development of social comparison are drawn largely 
from the ability conception literature, which examines children’s beliefs about ability 
related traits, most commonly “smartness.” Developmental shifts in children’s ability 
conceptions (i.e., their beliefs about being “smart”), purportedly underlie age-related 
change in the effects of social comparisons on self-evaluations (Butler, 1989). Support 
for this perspective comes from research that documents differential developmental 
trajectories for children’s understanding of comparative feedback (i.e., understanding that 
others have performed better or worse than the self) as compared to their use of such 
feedback for self-evaluation (i.e., adjusting self-evaluations based on the relative 
performance of others).  
A wealth of literature demonstrates that children as young as 5 years of age 
engage in comparison and understand comparative feedback. By this age, children 
engage in spontaneous comparison discourse (e.g., “I have more than this”; Chafel, 
1986). For example, children observed in a classroom setting while completing 
independent work often make remarks about their own work (e.g., “I’m on page 20.”) and 
others’ work (e.g., “You spelled this wrong.”). Children also make explicit comparative 
statements about their work in relation to others’ (e.g., “She's on 13, and I'm only on 10”; 
Frey & Ruble, 1985). Young children not only attend to their peers’ task progress, but are 
relatively accurate in using this information to rank peers in terms of their performance 
(Morris & Nemcek, 1982; Ruble & Frey, 1987). Children also demonstrate an 
understanding of their own performance relative to peers. For example, when given the 
opportunity to view their peers’ performance outcomes (e.g., how fast a peer ran a race), 
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5- to 6-year-olds preferentially choose peers who performed similarly to themselves (e.g., 
peers who ranked one place above or below themselves; Morris & Nemcek, 1982). As 
early as second grade, children’s understanding of their own performance in relation to 
peers is evident in their selection of future competitors. For example, Ruble and 
colleagues (1980) found that children prefer to compete against a peer whom they have 
outperformed in the past (i.e., downward comparison) rather than an unknown peer. 
Conversely, children prefer to compete against an unknown peer rather than a peer who 
has outperformed them in the past (i.e., upward comparison).  
Although young children understand relative performance feedback (Morris & 
Nemcek, 1982) and show interest in peers’ academic work (Frey & Ruble, 1985), 
viewing peers’ work has little influence on self-evaluations until 7 years of age 
(Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Butler, 1998; Levine & Green, 1984; Pomerantz, Ruble, Frey, 
& Greulich, 1995; Ruble et al., 1980; Ruble, Eisenberg, & Higgins, 1994; Ruble, 
Feldman, & Boggiano, 1976; Ruble, Parsons, & Ross, 1976; but see Butler, 1998). It is 
theorized that young children disregard comparative feedback for self-evaluation because 
they interpret performance differences as resulting from temporary factors (e.g., effort; 
Nicholls, 1978) rather than stable differences in ability (e.g., smartness). Thus, young 
children likely view performance differences as irrelevant to self-evaluations because 
they believe that they need only to try harder to improve their performance. It is also 
important to note that simplified task settings (i.e., visual presentation and comparison of 
actual task products rather than only ratings of the products) have been shown to increase 
preschoolers’ use of social comparative feedback to inform self-evaluations (Butler, 
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1998). This suggests that younger children’s lack of attention to comparative feedback is 
in part due to constraints on information processing skills.  
As children enter middle childhood, the desire to learn about peers’ performance 
and view their work increases (Butler, 1989; Ruble et al., 1976). However, social 
comparison discourse becomes more subtle (Frey & Ruble, 1985). For example, 7- to 10-
year-olds often inquired about a peer’s progress (e.g., “What number are you on?”) rather 
than explicitly stating differences between their progress and others’ progress. 
Importantly, by 7 years of age, children report lower self-evaluations when upward social 
comparative feedback about a non-descript peer is provided, rather than an objective 
performance standard (e.g., task success or failure feedback; Ruble et al., 1980). Such 
effects are purportedly related to older children’s tendency to interpret relative failure as 
resulting from stable differences in ability (e.g., intelligence; Butler, 1989). Thus, older 
children often view performance discrepancies between themselves and peers as 
indicators of their capabilities and therefore, useful for self-evaluation.  
There are also direct links between fixed conceptualizations of ability and social 
comparison behaviors. For example, task descriptions that emphasize fixed ability 
conceptions (e.g., indicating that the task assesses ability rather than performance) 
increase sixth graders’ interest in comparative feedback (Butler, 1992). Individual 
differences in beliefs about ability as constant also relate to comparison behaviors. In 
middle childhood, children who frequently endorse beliefs of ability as constant seek out 
more social comparative feedback than children who endorse these beliefs less often 
(Ruble & Flett, 1988).  
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 Given the significance of ability conceptions for children’s interpretation of 
comparative feedback, other types of information related to ability conceptions may also 
be relevant to developmental changes in social comparison. Children’s conceptualizations 
of expertise may be particularly important to interpretations of comparative feedback. 
Possession of high expertise entails that an individual has substantial knowledge in a 
domain, which in turn is related to conceptions of high ability (Yussen & Kane, 1985). 
For example, when defining “smart”, children tend to reference spontaneously to the 
amount of knowledge an individual possesses, and this tendency increases with age 
(Kurtz-Costes, McCall, Kinlaw, Wiesen, & Joyner, 2005). Like ability, children may 
interpret relative failure as stemming from differences in knowledge between themselves 
and peers (i.e., expertise), rather than temporary factors (e.g., effort). Indeed, as children 
age, they view effort as less relevant to task performance, whereas previous experience 
and ability related traits are seen as increasingly important (Weisz, Yeates, Robertson, 
Beckham, 1982). This provides further support for the proposed importance of expertise 
information because experience is a component of expertise and is typically used to 
describe experts (e.g., “Jenny…knows a lot about dogs. She is an animal doctor and 
works with dogs all the time.”; Koenig & Jaswal, 2011).  
 Although conceptualizations of expertise and ability become more interrelated 
with age, a key difference between these two characteristics is that they vary in the extent 
to which they are essentialized with age. Essentialism refers to beliefs that characteristics 
are biologically based, present at birth, stable over time, and immune to change (Gelman, 
Heyman, & Legare, 2007). Given that beliefs about ability as stable are posited to 
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underlie the development of social comparison, the degree to which expertise and ability 
related traits are essentialized should be relevant to consideration of these characteristics 
in a comparison setting.  
A wealth of literature has examined trait essentialism (e.g., physical, 
psychological, and ability related traits). Essentialist beliefs about ability related traits are 
evident by 5 years of age, become more prevalent with age, and are more prevalent than 
essentialist beliefs about personality traits (e.g., “nice”; Gelman et al., 2007; Heyman & 
Giles, 2004). For example, 7- to 14-year-olds require less evidence to attribute ability 
related traits than personality traits (Heyman & Giles, 2004). Between 5 and 10 years of 
age, children increasingly expect ability related traits, as compared to personality traits, to 
be linked to nature rather than nurture (e.g., believe that an adopted individual will share 
ability related traits with their birth parents rather than adopted parents; Heyman & 
Gelman, 2000). As noted previously, young children conceptualize ability related traits as 
able to change, but by middle to late childhood, they are more likely to indicate that 
abilities (e.g., intelligence) cannot change (Gelman et al., 2007; Heyman & Giles 2004).  
In contrast to traits, expertise has not been conceptualized in an essentialist 
framework, as knowledge always has the possibility to change (Lockhart, Goddu, & Keil, 
2016). There is evidence that children and adults hold non-essentialist beliefs about 
expertise in regards to malleability (i.e., whether an individual can change how much 
they know about a topic over time). Findings indicate that between early and late 
childhood, expertise is seen as relatively malleable. Although younger children are more 
optimistic about the amount of knowledge that one will acquire across the lifespan, even 
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8- to 12-year-olds expect that an individual’s level of knowledge will change 
significantly across the lifespan. Other than conceptions of malleability, essentialist 
concepts are unlikely to apply to reasoning about expertise (e.g., biological basis, 
stability). Given that expertise is not thought of in essentialist ways, the methodology 
used to assess expertise understanding necessarily diverges from that used to assess 
ability related traits. For example, it is common to ask “Do you think that George was 
born shy” (Gelman et al., 2007), but not “Do you think George was born knowing all 
about dogs?”  
Divergent developmental essentialist beliefs about these characteristics may alter 
how children interpret relative failure. Specifically, the provision of expertise information 
in a comparison setting should enhance reflection on malleable causes of performance 
differences (e.g., experience), resulting in weak effects of comparative feedback. 
Conversely, ability related traits should highlight malleable causes of performance 
differences in young children, but fixed ability reasoning in older children, as these are 
the predominant ways in which children view ability related traits across development. 
Despite this divergence in essentialist thinking, there are substantial similarities in the 
developmental conceptualizations of expertise and ability related traits as described 
above, and these cues should both be meaningful in a comparison context. 
Role of Peer Characteristics in Social Comparison 
As reviewed above, there is strong evidence to suggest that ability conceptions are 
related to social comparison. Thus, the provision of comparison peer characteristics that 
denote competence (i.e., expertise and ability related traits) are likely to impact children’s 
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interpretations of relative failure, and thereby, self-evaluations. Few developmental 
studies have examined the effects of comparison peer characteristics on children’s self-
evaluations, particularly in early childhood. 
One relevant line of research has assessed the effects of comparison peers’ social 
categories (e.g., gender) on self-evaluations. Such studies have shown that when a 
comparison peer’s gender is made salient, even preschoolers’ self-evaluations are 
impaired by comparative feedback (Cimpian, 2010). For example, Rhodes & Brickman 
(2008) told 4- and 5-year olds that they were outperformed on a tracing task by a same 
gender, opposite gender, or gender unidentified peer. Children then rated their 
performance on the task. Next, children completed an additional trial of the task in which 
they were told that they were more successful than the peer. Finally, children rated their 
performance again after this second trial. When the peer was the same gender as the 
participant or an unidentified gender, children’s self-evaluations improved between the 
unsuccessful and successful trials. Conversely, when the peer was the opposite gender of 
the participant, children’s self-evaluations remained low even after the second more 
successful trial. These findings suggest that when category membership is made salient, 
children likely interpret task performance as linked to such categories, particularly when 
the child and comparison peer are members of different groups. For example, when a 
female child is outperformed by a male peer, the female child may interpret that the 
peer’s superior performance was a result of a gender-linked ability. This type of 
interpretation highlights the role of ability in task performance and reveals that even 
preschoolers’ self-evaluations can be influenced by relative failure.  
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 Older children are increasingly sensitive to comparative feedback and 
characteristics of comparison peers. By middle to late childhood, the effects of 
comparative feedback vary based not only on the nature of the comparison (i.e., upward 
vs. downward), but on the nature of the peer relationship. For example, 9- to 11-year-
olds’ academic self-concept is related to naturalistic comparisons with reciprocated 
friends (i.e., both children consider each other friends), but not with non-reciprocated 
friends (i.e., only one child considers the other a friend; Altermatt & Pomerantz, 2003). 
Additionally, experimental studies have shown that comparative feedback has a greater 
influence on 9- and 10-year-olds’ self-perceptions when peers are described as 
competitors (Butler, 1989).  
Based on the reviewed findings, it is evident that across early to late childhood, 
there is an emerging sensitivity to comparative feedback and the characteristics of 
comparison peers. In early childhood, salient information about group membership (i.e., 
gender) facilitates the use of comparison information for self-evaluation, whereas in later 
childhood, subtler peer characteristics are considered (e.g., friendship status). Given that 
seemingly task-unrelated characteristics influence social comparison outcomes, there is a 
strong basis for additional examination of comparison peer attributes. Characteristics that 
are related to competence (e.g., expertise and ability related traits), and thereby task 
performance, should be particularly relevant. 
The Present Research 
The current studies examined the effects of two developmentally salient peer 
characteristics, expertise (Experiment 1) and ability related traits (e.g., smartness; 
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Experiment 2), on 5- to 10-year-olds’ social comparison outcomes. The studies provide 
novel insight about how children treat the same social comparative feedback differently 
based on comparison peers’ expertise and traits. For example, if children are 
outperformed by a peer, do they perceive their performance as particularly poor when the 
peer is a novice, but more favorably when the peer is an expert? In either case, children 
have failed (to the same degree) relative to a peer, but peer competence information may 
alter the way that children construe relative failure. Instances of relative failure (i.e., 
upward social comparisons) were of particular interest for two main reasons. First, it is 
well established that downward comparisons result in favorable self-evaluations (e.g., 
Ruble et al., 1976b) and thus, are not likely to be influenced by contextual information. 
Second, children’s responses to failure, rather than success, are related to achievement 
motivation and academic outcomes (Kamins & Dweck, 1999). Similarly, relative failure 
results in poor self-evaluations (e.g., Ruble et al, 1980). Thus, it was of practical 
significance to identify circumstances under which these negative outcomes may be 
altered.  
Given that expertise information guides children’s decision making as early as the 
preschool years, peer expertise was expected to be salient and influential in the context of 
relative failure (e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2004). For example, when given conflicting 
information by a person described as an expert and a person described as a layperson, 
even preschoolers prefer to endorse the information provided by the expert as correct 
(e.g., Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). With age, children’s’ understanding of the varying content 
of expertise is refined (Keil, Stein, Webb, Billings, & Rozenblit, 2008). Even 9-year-olds 
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have an adult-like understanding of the distinctions between domains of expertise (e.g., 
natural vs. social sciences; Keil et al., 2008). By this age, children also understand 
distinctions in the knowledge content of experts with narrow and broad domains of 
expertise (e.g., an animal expert versus a poodle expert; Landrum & Mills, 2015). These 
children also prefer experts rather than lay people to teach them how to complete a task 
(Boseovski, Hughes, & Miller, 2016), suggesting an awareness that experts should 
perform better than laypeople on tasks within the domain of expertise.  
Similar to expertise, ability related traits are influential to children’s reasoning in 
a variety of domains (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Relevant here, ability related traits 
are connected to children’s perceptions of achievement and this relation becomes 
stronger with age. For instance, 5- to 8-year-olds typically explain academic outcomes in 
terms of actions (e.g., studies a lot), whereas 10-year-olds use these types of explanations 
as well as trait explanations (e.g., “He’s smart”; Benenson & Dweck, 1986). Ability 
related traits are also linked with academic outcomes. Specifically, praise and criticism of 
children’s academic outcomes through the use of ability related trait references (e.g., 
praising good performance with “You are so smart!”) convey that intelligence is fixed 
and thereby results in negative psychosocial outcomes (e.g., academic helplessness; 
Kamins & Dweck, 1999), particularly in response to failure.  
Because ability related traits are essentialized, but expertise is not, the 
examination of these cues in a similar task context can elucidate the role of ability 
conceptions as a mechanism of age-related change in social comparison. Limited effects 
of expertise as compared to ability related traits would suggest that fixed ability 
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conceptions facilitate the use of comparative feedback for self-evaluation. These two cues 
were also assessed across an age range in which the positivity bias declines. 
Undifferentiated self-evaluations by young children in response to these two cues would 
provide evidence that their views of expertise and ability as malleable lend themselves to 
positive self-evaluations in the face of relative failure. Furthermore, developmental 
change in children’s positivity is likely to be reflected in their overall self-evaluations 
(i.e., younger children should report more positive self-evaluations than older children).  
The present studies also merge two disparate areas of research by investigating 
children’s reasoning about expertise as compared to traits as cues of peer competence. 
Moreover, the investigation provides insight into children’s reasoning about expertise and 
trait information in a self-evaluative context, whereas previous research has focused 
largely on contexts that are not self-evaluative (e.g., Koenig & Jaswal, 2011; Kurtz-
Costes, et al., 2005). Thus, the current studies address the paucity of research on the 
relation between children’s beliefs about these characteristics and provide information 
about their differential relevance to ability conceptions with age.
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Five-, 8-, and 10-year-olds were told that they were outperformed by an expert 
peer or a novice peer and then reported their self-evaluations. As described above, by 7 to 
8 years of age, children demonstrate a well-developed sensitivity to both expertise 
(Aguiar, Stoess, & Taylor, 2012) and comparative feedback (Ruble et al., 1980). 
Therefore, by this age, it is likely that children will be able to consider both types of 
information in the self-evaluation process. Beyond this, there are three main reasons to 
expect that expertise information should be highly relevant to children’s social 
comparison outcomes. First, a comparison peer’s level of expertise should have 
implications for the accuracy of self-evaluations (Festinger, 1954). An individual is more 
likely to form accurate self-evaluations from comparisons with a peer who has a similar, 
rather than different, level of expertise. For example, if a child is a novice piano player, it 
would be more useful to compare his or her piano abilities to another beginner, rather 
than a child who has been playing for several years. It would be unrealistic to expect a 
beginner to perform at a similar level as an individual who has years of practice with a 
task and specialized knowledge about the domain. Thus, when an individual is a novice, 
comparisons with experts should be disregarded as uninformative. Although children’s 
reasoning about expertise in a social comparison context has not been examined, research 
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has shown that adults typically disregard such extreme comparisons (Sanders, 1982; Seta, 
1982).  
Second, as noted above, expertise is related to ability conceptions. Specifically, 
children conceptualize knowledge as a defining feature of ability, at least in the domain 
of intelligence (Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005; Yussen & Kane, 1985). Given that 
developmental changes in social comparison are related to ability conceptions (Butler, 
1989), and expertise is a component of ability conceptions (Yussen & Kane; 1985), 
expertise should also have implications for social comparison. In particular, denoting a 
comparison peer’s level of expertise may alter children’s interpretation of the source of 
performance discrepancies between themselves and a comparison peer (e.g., the 
discrepancy is due to fixed differences in ability vs. effort or luck). Additionally, peer 
expertise information should affect children’s expectations of how a peer will perform on 
the task (e.g., an expert peer should perform well; Boseovski et al., 2016; Weisz et al., 
1982).  
Third, expertise is a relevant informational cue that is sometimes preferred in 
social decision making even in the face of salient social categories. In one study, 4- to 8-
year-olds were given conflicting information by a gender stereotypical layperson (e.g., a 
female with little knowledge of sewing) and a gender counter-stereotypical expert (e.g., a 
male sewing expert). Children of all ages tended to endorse the gender counter-
stereotypical expert as correct, demonstrating that they prioritized expertise over gender 
as an indicator of superior knowledge (Boseovski et al., 2016). Given the influence of 
gender information in previous social comparison studies (Rhodes & Brickman, 2008), it 
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is reasonable to expect that expertise would also be salient to children in a social 
comparison setting.  
Although even preschoolers show a sophisticated understanding of expertise (e.g., 
Lutz & Keil, 2002; Danovitch & Keil, 2004), appropriate use of expertise information in 
a comparison context may not occur until middle to late childhood, when expertise 
reasoning is more adult-like (Keil et al., 2008). There are two relevant limitations in 
young children’s expertise reasoning that may impede its use in a social comparative 
context. First, as discussed previously, children sometimes prioritize positively valenced 
informational cues above other information. This bias for positive information has been 
documented in children’s reasoning about expertise. For example, when informants are 
labeled in trait terms (i.e., mean and nice), preschoolers are less likely to endorse 
information provided by a “mean” expert informant than a “nice” lay informant 
(Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 2013; Exp. 2 and 3). Additionally, 6- and 7-year-olds are 
less willing to accept negative information about a novel animal (e.g., “very dangerous”) 
as compared to positive information (e.g., “very friendly”), even when the negative 
information was provided by a zookeeper and the positive information was provided by a 
layperson (Boseovski & Thurman, 2014). Thus, children’s preference for positive 
information can override their reliance on expert testimony. Similarly, children’s desire 
to view themselves positively may override their consideration of peer expertise in a 
social comparison setting.  
 Second, young children have difficulty reasoning about expertise in self-relevant 
contexts (i.e., when they must assess their own expertise relative to others, rather than 
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only judging other individuals’ expertise). For example, 4- and 5-year-olds can direct 
domain-specific questions to relevant experts (e.g. assign medical questions to doctors, 
but farming questions to farmers; Lutz & Keil, 2002; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010). 
However, when they are given the option to assign such questions to themselves, in 
addition to relevant or irrelevant experts, children often erroneously believe that they can 
answer the questions (Aguiar et al., 2012; Exp. 2 and 3). Developmental change in the 
effects of self-relevant contexts may be related to the theory of mind (ToM) demands 
imposed by such contexts. Indeed, advanced ToM skills are related to more sophisticated 
reasoning about expertise (Danovitch, 2013). In this context, even when children defer to 
experts, they are poor at identifying the relevant expert. This suggests that the assessment 
of self- and other-knowledge may interfere with young children’s ability to assess others’ 
expertise.  
In the current study, 5-, 8-, and 10-year-olds were told that they were 
outperformed by a novice or expert peer on a novel task (i.e. Tower of Hanoi; ToH) and a 
familiar task (i.e., drawing). Drawing was selected as a commonplace activity, whereas 
the ToH task (Welsh, 1991) was expected to be unfamiliar to children. After each task, 
children reported self-evaluations (i.e., feelings about their performance, performance 
evaluations, and ability evaluations) and made predictions about their likelihood of 
winning a competition in that domain. Finally, to assess whether perceptions of task 
demands differed across age groups and tasks, children provided ratings of task difficulty. 
This measure was included because age and task related differences in perceptions of 
difficulty may influence children’s self-evaluations. For example, when children perceive 
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a task as difficult, they may judge their performance to be poor (Heyman, Gee, & Giles, 
2003; Saxe & Sicilian, 1981) 
 Hypothesis 1: Given young children’s generally positive world view 
(Boseovski, 2010) and limited expertise reasoning in self-relevant contexts 
(e.g., Aguiar et al., 2012), 5-year-olds’ self-evaluations (i.e., affect and 
performance ratings) were expected to be high regardless of peer 
expertise.  
 Hypothesis 2: Given that 8-year-olds are sensitive to comparative 
feedback (Ruble et al., 1980), but sometimes display a positivity bias in 
expertise reasoning (Boseovski & Thurman, 2014), it was unclear how 
they would respond to peer expertise. One possibility is that they would 
report similar self-evaluations irrespective of expertise, but that their self-
evaluations would be generally lower than those of younger children.  
 Hypothesis 3: Ten-year-olds’ self-evaluations were expected to be lower 
after being outperformed by a novice as opposed to an expert and this 
effect was predicted to be more robust in a familiar domain. Negative 
feedback may have a greater effect on self-evaluations in a familiar 
domain, as upward comparisons may confirm preexisting negative self-
perceptions (Schunk & Pajares, 2002) or because these domains may be 
perceived as more personally significant (Bers & Rodin, 1986).  
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 Hypothesis 4: Children’s ability evaluations were expected to be 
unaffected, as multiple comparisons are generally necessary to influence 
these evaluations (Ruble et al., 1980).  
 Hypothesis 5: Older children were predicted to report lower expectations 
of winning a competition when they were outperformed by an expert as 
compared to a novice, as the provision of peer expertise information may 
cue them to reflect on the background knowledge and experience of their 
possible competitors. Younger children’s competition expectations were 
not expected to vary, as the use of comparison information to guide the 
selection of competitors is not evident until the second grade (Ruble et al., 
1980; Exp. 2). 
 Hypothesis 6: Children’s ratings of task difficulty were expected to 
decrease with age for two reasons. First, younger children may genuinely 
perceive the tasks as more difficult than older children, given their 
relatively limited cognitive skills. Second, older children interpret tasks to 
be easier in instances of relative failure, as opposed to when no 
comparison information is provided (Ruble et al., 1980; Exp. 1). 
Conversely, younger children do not distinguish between these contexts 
and rate task difficulty high in either case. 
Method 
Participants. Forty-one 5-year-olds (M = 66.2 months, SD = 3.7, 23 males), 43 8-
year-olds (M = 102.2 months, SD = 3.2, 19 males), and 42 10-year-olds (M = 126.7 
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months, SD = 3.6, 24 males) were tested in a Southeastern city. Concerning demographic 
data, 74.6% of children were Caucasian, 15.9% African American, 7.9% mixed race, 
0.8% Asian; 0.8% of families did not disclose this information. Family income ranged 
from less than $20,000 to over $90,000.  
Materials. In the drawing task, an 8.5 x 11 inch line drawing of a cat was used. 
For the ToH, wooden stacking toys were used with discs of varying colors. Social 
comparison feedback was provided on a 13 inch Macbook Pro and scores were displayed 
on PowerPoint slides in full screen mode. A cardboard face with an adjustable mouth was 
used to assess children’s affective states (Ruble et al., 1976). 
Design and Procedure. A mixed design was used to assess the effects of age 
(between-subjects: 5-, 8-, and 10-year-olds), comparison peer expertise (between-
subjects: expert vs. novice), and domain (within-subjects: novel vs. familiar) on 
children’s self-evaluations. Children were tested in the university laboratory or their day 
care facility by a female experimenter in one session. The order of the two social 
comparison tasks was counterbalanced across participants.  
Novel domain. As the ToH was meant to serve as the novel task, children who 
were familiar with it were excluded from the current sample. Given the novelty of the 
task, children were given extensive training and instructions to ensure that they 
understood the rules before they completed the task for feedback (see Welsh, 1991). 
Children were presented with the two wooden stacking toys and the experimenter 
described the task as the “flerping game,” a nonsense term selected to further increase the 
novelty of the task. Children were told that the goal of the game was to get all of their 
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discs to the last post in increasing size. The experimenter’s toy remained in this goal state 
as a visual reminder of the goal that children had to meet. Children completed three 
practice trials for which they received corrective feedback and repetitions of the rules. 
Additionally, if children made mistakes on the practice trials, these trials were repeated 
until children could complete them all successfully.  
Next, children were told “Now that you understand the rules, you’re going to play 
the flerping game for three minutes. Try to get as many as you can and try not to make 
mistakes.” Time was not actually limited (i.e., children played until they completed five 
trials), but was introduced as a supposed factor to increase performance ambiguity. 
Afterward, the experimenter pretended to enter information in the computer saying, 
“Now I’ll put in how many moves you made and how long it took you to finish. Then the 
computer will tell us how you did on the flerping game. You will get a score in stars. The 
more stars you get, the better you did on the flerping game.” The experimenter showed 
children a display of nine stars and said “You got nine stars on the flerping game.”  
Next, children were told that the computer had other children’s scores as well. 
Based on their pre-assigned condition, children received a description of either an expert 
or novice peer who was of the same gender as the participant. For example, in the expert 
condition, male children were told: “Casey is a boy your age. He goes to a school like 
yours and likes to play with his friends. He knows a lot about flerping. After school, he 
often takes special lessons on how to flerp. He knows how to flerp with lots of discs and 
posts. He flerps in front of lots of people. He has won competitions for his flerping.” Full 
descriptions of the provided expertise information are supplied in Appendix A. The 
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experimenter then showed children a visual display and stated, “Casey got 11 stars on the 
flerping game.” The scores of 9 and 11 were selected so as to avoid the suggestion of a 
normative maximum (e.g., scores of 5 and 7 may suggest that the maximum was 10).  
Children answered four comprehension questions: “Did Casey know a little or a 
lot about flerping?” “How many stars did you get?”, “How many stars did Casey get?”, 
and “Who did better? You or Casey?” Then, children’s beliefs about the influence of 
expertise on the peer’s performance were assessed. The goal of these questions was to 
examine whether children viewed expert status, but not novice status, as a likely cause of 
the peer’s performance. Peer performance questions were based on children’s 
preassigned condition (expert condition: “Did Casey get 11 stars because he knew a lot 
about flerping?”; novice condition: “Did Casey get 11 stars because he knew a little about 
flerping?”). “Yes” responses were coded as 1 and “no” responses were coded as 0.  
Next, children answered three self-evaluation questions (Ruble et al., 1994). First, 
they were asked, “How do you feel about how you did on the flerping game?” and 
manipulated the mouth on the face to indicate their affective state (marks on the side of 
the face allowed for scoring; 1 = very sad, 9 = in between, 17 = very happy). Second, they 
were asked about their performance evaluations, “How do well do you think you did on 
the flerping game?” and ability evaluations, “How good do you think you are at doing 
games like the flerping game?” for which they responded on a 9-point Likert scale 
accompanied by a display of circles of increasing size (1 = not good at all, 9 = very 
good). Children provided open ended explanations for their self-evaluations. Affect and 
performance evaluations were coded for references to positive performance, negative 
24  
performance, effort, and enjoyment. Ability explanations were coded for references to 
practice, abilities, and enjoyment (see Appendix B for examples). All responses were 
coded by one rater and another rater coded 20% of responses to establish interrater 
reliability, which was high for all variables (Cohen’s kappas: .84-.91).  
Children also answered a competition prediction question, “If we had a 
competition with the flerping game, do you think you could beat other kids and win the 
competition?” Predictions that the child would win were scored as 1, whereas predictions 
that the child would not win were scored as 0. Finally, children evaluated the difficulty of 
the task with the same circle scale used previously, but different descriptions of the 
values were provided (1 = not hard at all, 9 = very hard).  
Familiar domain. For the drawing task, children were shown a line drawing of a 
cat and told “Now we’re going to play a drawing game. This is a picture of a cat. In this 
game, you have to try and draw this picture on your own. You will get 3 minutes to draw 
it. Try and make your drawing as close as possible to this picture here and try not to make 
mistakes.” Again, time to complete the task was not really limited (i.e., continued until 
they finished their drawing). Next, the experimenter took a digital picture of the child’s 
drawing and said, “We are going to put your picture on the computer…the computer will 
grade it and tell us how close your picture was to this one.” Remaining procedures for 
feedback and self-evaluations were identical to those above.  
Results 
One 10-year-old female was excluded from data analyses because she was 
familiar with the ToH task. One 5-year-old male was excluded because he failed the 
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practice trials of the ToH. All children answered all four comprehension questions 
correctly.  
Peer Performance Question. Descriptive data are presented in Table 1. Children 
of all ages reliably indicated that the expert peer got 11 stars because he or she “knew a 
lot” about the domain (drawing: 100%); t-tests against chance for each age group 
indicated that this was also true for flerping (96%), ps < .05. In the novice condition, 8- 
and 10-year olds rejected the idea that the novice peer got 11 stars because they “knew a 
little” about the domain (drawing: 82.9%; flerping 82.9%, ps < .05), but 5-year-olds’ 
responses did not differ significantly from chance in either domain: (drawing: 60%; 
flerping, 52.6%), ps > .10. 
Table 1 
Proportion of “Yes” Responses to the Peer Performance Question in Experiment 1 (by 
Age and Peer Expertise) and Experiment 2 (by Age and Trait Valence). 
 Experiment 1 
 Familiar 
 Expert  Novice 
Age in  
Years 
M SE N  M SE N 
5 .74 .10 19  .50 .11 20 
8 .38 .11 21  .77 .09 22 
10 .52 .11 21  .57 .11 21 
 Novel 
 Expert  Novice 
Age in  
Years 
M SE N  M SE N 
5 .70 .11 20  .70 .11 20 
8 .62 .10 21  .55 .11 22 
10 .52 .11 21  .81 .09 21 
 Experiment 2 
 Positive  Negative 
Age in  
Years 
M SE N  M SE N 
5-6 .60 .10 25  .80 .08 25 
9-10 .67 .10 24  .37 .10 24 
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Do Children’s Self-Evaluations Vary by Age, Expertise, and Domain? 
Descriptive data are presented in Table 2. Data were analyzed using a series of 3 (age: 5-
year-olds vs. 8-year-olds vs. 10-year-olds; between-subjects) x 2 (target expertise: expert 
vs. novice; between-subjects) x 2 (domain: familiar vs. novel; within-subjects) mixed 
ANOVAs. There were no significant effects or interactions involving gender or task 
order on any dependent measures; thus, these variables were excluded from the final 
models.  
Affect. Five-year-olds felt better about their performance than older children, F(2, 
120) = 7.27, p = .001, ηp2 = .11. There was a significant interaction between age and 
domain, F(2, 120) = 3.62, p = .03, ηp2 = .06. To examine the nature of this interaction, 
follow-up 2 (domain: familiar vs. novel) x 2 (expertise: expert vs. novice) ANOVAs were 
conducted for each age group. Ten-year-olds’ affective rating varied significantly by 
domain, F(1, 40) = 5.71, p = .02, ηp2 = .13. Post-hoc paired t-tests indicated that 10-year-
olds’ affective ratings were more positive in the novel domain (M = 14.44, SD = 2.40) 
than the familiar domain (M = 13.51, SD = 2.75), t(41) = -2.33, p = .03. Conversely, 5- 
and 8-year-olds’ affective ratings did not differ by domain, ps > .05, and were relatively 
positive (see Table 2). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .05. 
Performance. There were significant main effects of age, F(2, 120) = 5.94, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .09, and expertise, F(1, 120) = 5.04, p = .03, ηp2 = .04. These effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction between age, peer expertise, and domain, F(2, 120) 
= 2.93, p = .05, ηp2 = .05; see Figure 1a. To examine this interaction, follow-up 2 
  
Table 2 
Mean Self-Evaluations in Experiment 1 (by Age, Domain, and Peer Expertise) and Experiment 2 (by Age and Trait 
Valence).  
 Experiment 1 
 Familiar Task  
 Expert  Novice 
 Affect  Performance  Ability  Affect  Performance  Ability 
Age in 
Years 
M SE N  M SE N  M SE N  M SE N  M SE N  M SE N 
5 15.60 .60 20  8.00 .47 20  8.80 .11 20  16.23 .40 21  8.23 .26 21  8.47 .25 21 
8 14.19 .53 21  7.52 .25 21  7.47 .38 21  13.09 .99 22  6.73 .31 22  8.00 .23 22 
10 14.00 .79 21  7.42 .34 21  7.25 .43 21  13.14 .62 21  6.52 .25 21  7.05 .36 21 
 Novel Task 
 Expert  Novice 
 Affect.  Performance  Ability  Affect  Performance  Ability 
Age 
in 
Years 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
5 15.30 1.33 20  8.25 .45 20  8.60 .21 20  14.80 .64 21  7.57 .48 21  7.90 .37 21 
8 13.52 .85 21  7.76 .24 21  7.95 .25 21  11.77 .99 22  6.68 .31 22  7.36 .36 22 
10 14.29 .54 21  7.47 .25 21  7.38 .39 21  14.71 .54 21  7.52 .24 21  7.81 .27 21 
 Experiment 2 
 Positive Trait  Negative Trait 
 Affect.  Performance  Ability  Affect  Performance  Ability 
Age 
in 
Years 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
 
M SE N 
5-6 14.76 .85 25  7.76 .45 25  8.44 .32 25  15.32 .57 25  7.80 .45 25  8.24 .22 25 
9-10 14.79 .44 24  7.42 .20 24  7.46 .26 24  10.88 .70 24  6.04 .19 24  6.92 .24 24 
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Figure 1a. Mean Performance Evaluations by Age, Domain, and Expertise. *p < .05 
 
Figure 1b. Proportion of Participants Who Reported that They Could Win a Competition by Age, Domain, and 
Expertise. *p < .05 
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(domain: familiar vs. novel) x 2 (expertise: expert vs. novice) ANOVAs were conducted 
for each age group. Five-year-olds’ evaluations were relatively high and did not differ by 
peer expertise or domain, ps > .05. Eight-year-olds reported lower evaluations when they 
were outperformed by a novice rather than an expert irrespective of domain, F(1, 41) = 
7.55, p = .01, ηp2 = .16. Ten-year-olds’ evaluations varied by domain and expertise, F(1, 
40) = 5.83, p = .02, ηp2 = .13; Post-hoc independent samples t-tests indicated that 10-
year-olds reported lower evaluations after being outperformed by a novice rather than an 
expert in the familiar domain, t(40) = -2.06, p = .05, but not the novel domain, t(40) = 
0.14, p = .89. Eight- and 10-year-olds’ evaluations after expert comparisons were high; 
indeed, they were not significantly different from 5-year-olds’ evaluations in either 
domain, ps > .10.  
Ability. Ability ratings decreased with age, F(1, 120) = 11.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .16, 
but were quite high (see Table 2). No other main effects or interactions were significant, 
ps > .05.  
Do Children’s Competition Predictions Vary by Age, Expertise, and 
Domain? Children’s responses to the competition question were analyzed using a 
Generalized Estimating Equation with a binary logistic model. The corrected quasi-
likelihood under an independence model criterion (QICC), a measure of goodness of fit, 
was used to assess the best model predictors (Pan, 2001). Three models were compared: 
(1) main effects model (2) main effects and all 2-way interactions (3) a full factorial 
model. The best fitting model (QICC = 339.47) captured a significant interaction between 
age, condition, and domain, β = -3.17, Wald χ2 = 7.12, p < .01 (see Table 3). To examine 
  
Table 3 
GEE Binary Logistic Regression Models for Competition Predictions in Experiment 1 
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Wald χ2 df Sig.  Wald χ2 df Sig.  Wald χ2 df Sig. 
Age 0.98 2 .614  1.10 2 .578  0.91 2 .634 
Expertise 1.27 1 .261  0.60 1 .319  1.18 1 .278 
Domain 0.60 1 .250  0.60 1 .242  1.29 1 .256 
Age x Expertise     0.60 2 .107  4.49 2 .106 
Age x Domain     0.60 2 .673  1.07 2 .585 
Expertise x Domain     0.60 1 .980  0.02 1 .901 
Age x Expertise x 
Domain 
        8.45 2 .015* 
            
(Intercept) 11.834 1   12.29 1   12.19 1  
QICC 338.32  343.13  339.48 
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this interaction, post-hoc Chi-Square tests were conducted for each domain and age group 
to assess whether responses differed significantly by expertise. Five-year-olds’ responses 
did not vary significantly by condition in either domain, p’s > .10, whereas 8- and 10-
year-olds’ responses varied by both condition and domain. Eight-year-olds indicated that 
they were more likely to win a drawing competition when the peer was a novice rather 
than an expert, χ2(1, N = 43) = 6.78, p < .01, whereas their responses did not vary by peer 
expertise in the novel domain, χ2(1, N = 43) = 0.24, p = .63. This pattern was reversed for 
10-year-olds: they indicated that they were more likely to win a flerping competition 
when the peer was a novice rather than an expert, χ2(1, N = 42) = 3.86, p = .05, but their 
responses did not vary by peer expertise in the familiar domain, χ2(1, N = 42) = 0.09, p = 
.76, see Figure 1b.  
Additionally, t-tests against chance (0.50) demonstrated that 5-year-olds were 
more likely than expected by chance to report that they could win a drawing competition, 
but only after an expert peer comparison, t(19) = 2.28, p = .04. Conversely, 8-year-olds 
were more likely than expected by chance to report that they could win a drawing 
competition only after a novice peer comparison, t(22) = 2.98, p = .01. Ten-year-olds’ 
expectations of winning a drawing competition, regardless of peer expertise, did not 
differ from chance levels, ps > .10. However, 10-year-olds were more likely than 
expected by chance to report that they could win a flerping competition after a novice 
peer comparison, t(21) = 3.53, p = .002. Children’s predictions in all other conditions did 
not differ significantly from chance levels, ps > .10. 
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 Do Children’s Task Difficulty Ratings Vary by Age, Expertise, and Domain? 
As with children’s self-evaluations, difficulty ratings were analyzed using a 3 (age: 5-
year-olds vs. 8-year-olds vs. 10-year-olds; between-subjects) x 2 (target expertise: expert 
vs. novice; between-subjects) x 2 (domain: familiar vs. novel; within-subjects) mixed 
ANOVA. There was a significant interaction between age and condition, F(2, 119) = 
4.20, p < .05, ηp2 = .07. Five-year-olds, t(79) = -2.16, p < .05, and 10-year-olds, t(82) = -
2.60, p < .05, rated the tasks as more difficult when they were outperformed by an expert 
peer (M = 6.20, SE = .55; M = 5.90, SE = .31) as compared to a novice peer (M = 4.56, 
SE = .52; M = 4.64, SE = .37). In contrast, 8-year-olds task difficulty ratings did not 
significantly differ when the peer was an expert (M = 4.45, SE = .43) as compared to a 
novice (M = 5.47, SE = .55), t(84) = 1.73, p > .05.  
Do Children’s Self-Evaluation Explanations Vary by Age and Domain? Data 
for participants who responded “I don’t know” were not analyzed (affect: 11.2%, 
performance: 15.8%, ability: 13.8%). Below, the most common explanations are 
provided; full descriptive data are provided in Table 4.  
Affect. Chi-square analysis were conducted within each domain to examine if 
children’s explanations varied by age. Children’s explanations of their affect in the 
familiar domain varied by age, χ2 (8, N = 115) = 15.15, p =.05. Five-year-olds most 
frequently cited enjoyment (36.1%) and perceived positive performance (27.8%) as the 
reason for their affective state. Conversely, 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds frequently 
referenced their perceived negative (40%, 35.9% respectively) and positive performance 
(25%, 30.8%). Children’s explanations of their affect in the novel domain also varied by 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Each Explanation Type by Domain, Age, and Evaluation Question in 
Experiment 1 
   Novel Domain   
   Affect   
 Positive 
Performance 
Negative 
Performance 
Effort/Practice Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t 
Know 
Age        
5 22.0% 14.6% 7.3% 19.5% 31.7% 4.9% 
8 11.6% 30.2% 23.3% 11.6% 9.3% 14.0% 
10 14.6% 31.7% 24.4% 17.1% 9.8% 2.4% 
   Performance   
 Positive 
Performance 
Negative 
Performance 
Effort/Practice Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t 
Know 
Age       
5 34.1% 7.3% 17.1% 0% 19.5% 22.0% 
8 18.6% 37.2% 18.6% 0% 16.3% 9.3% 
10 17.1% 39.0% 22.0% 0% 19.5% 2.4% 
   Ability   
 Practice Skill/Ability Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t Know 
Age      
5 19.5% 24.4% 17.1% 14.6% 24.4% 
8 32.6% 20.9% 16.3% 18.6% 11.6% 
10 41.5% 22.0% 19.5% 14.6% 2.4% 
   Familiar Domain   
   Affect   
 Positive 
Performance 
Negative 
Performance 
Effort/Practice Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t 
Know 
Age        
5 24.4% 12.2% 12.2% 31.7% 7.3% 12.2% 
8 23.3% 37.2% 16.3% 11.6% 4.7% 7.0% 
10 29.3% 34.1% 9.8% 9.8% 12.2% 4.9% 
   Performance   
 Positive 
Performance 
Negative 
Performance 
Effort/Practice Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t 
Know 
Age       
5 36.6% 9.8% 12.2% 0% 22.0% 19.5% 
8 37.2% 27.9 11.6% 0% 9.3% 14.0% 
10 31.7% 29.3% 12.2% 0% 19.5% 7.3% 
   Ability   
 Practice Skill/Ability Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t Know 
Age      
5 20.0% 37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 5.0% 
8 27.9% 25.6% 14.0% 23.3% 5.0% 
10 40.0% 32.5% 12.5% 10.0% 5.0% 
34 
age, χ2 (8, N = 116) = 16.88, p =.03. In this case, 5-year-olds frequently made 
miscellaneous responses (33.3%) and references to positive performance (23.1%), and 
enjoyment (20.5%). Conversely, 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds frequently made references 
to their perceived negative performance (35.1%, 32.5% respectively) and effort/practice 
(27%, 25%).  
Performance. Children’s explanations of their performance in the familiar 
domain did not vary significantly by age, χ2 (8, N = 108) = 6.70, p =.35. Across all age 
groups, the most common response was perceived positive performance (40.7%). 
Explanations of performance evaluations in the novel domain varied by age, χ2 (6, N = 
111) = 12.90, p =.04. Five-year-olds most frequently made references to positive 
performance perceptions (43.8%), whereas 8- and 10-year-olds most frequently 
referenced negative performance perceptions (41% and 40%, respectively).  
Abiity. Children’s explanations of their ability did not differ by age in either 
domain, ps > .10. Ability and effort/practice were the most common explanations in the 
familiar domain (ability: 33.9%; effort/practice: 31.3%). and novel domain (ability: 
24.8%; effort/practice: 36.7%). 
Discussion  
 The current findings are the first to reveal age-related change in children’s use of 
expertise information in a social comparison setting. Five-year-olds’ self-evaluations and 
competition predictions were positive despite relative failure. In contrast, 8- and 10-year-
olds reported lower performance evaluations following comparisons with novice peers as 
compared to expert peers, but this was limited to the familiar domain for the latter age 
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group. Additionally, 8- and 10-year-olds’ competition predictions varied by peer 
expertise in the expected direction; however, this was only the case for 8-year-olds in the 
familiar domain and 10-year-olds in the novel domain. Notably, peer expertise affected 
these children’s performance evaluations, but not their affect ratings and ability 
evaluations.  
Broadly, 5-year-olds’ positive self-evaluations (i.e., qualitative responses, affect, 
performance, and ability evaluations) are consistent with previous social comparison 
research (Pomerantz et al., 1995; Ruble et al., 1994). As discussed earlier, this disregard 
for comparative feedback likely stems from their perceptions of ability as malleable. 
Thus, relative failure has little meaning for self-evaluation. Similarly, the lack of 
differentiation in self-evaluations based on peer expertise may reflect young children’s 
perception of expertise as a particularly malleable characteristic, thereby providing 
limited usefulness for self-evaluation. Taken together, younger children’s unwillingness 
or inability to consider negative comparative feedback is consistent with children’s 
disregard of negative information in other contexts (e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 2006) and 
reflects a positivity bias exhibited early in life (Boseovski, 2010). Although these 
children typically use expertise information readily in a variety of contexts (e.g., learning 
about novel animals and artifacts; Koenig & Jaswal, 2011), they may disregard it in 
evaluative circumstances (Boseovski & Thurman, 2014).  
An alternative explanation for younger children’s disregard of peer expertise is 
that ToM skills (i.e., mental state reasoning) were required in this context and limitations 
in these skills may have restricted their understanding of the expertise information 
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provided. Generally, preschoolers’ ability to make inferences about others’ false beliefs is 
associated with expertise reasoning (Danovitch, 2013). Such skills may be important 
because they allow children to reason about what an individual could feasibly know. The 
youngest children may have struggled to recognize that a novice has little task knowledge 
and that relative failure in this case indicates particularly poor performance. Indeed, on 
the peer performance questions, 5-year-olds understood the connection between high 
expertise and successful performance, but they were unsure about the connection between 
low expertise and performance. This is consistent with other work showing that young 
children may not view novice status as a predictor of poor performance (Boseovski et al., 
2016). Therefore, failure relative to a novice was especially unlikely to result in poor 
performance evaluations.  
The self-relevant context created in the current study likely exacerbated ToM 
demands (e.g., recognition of discrepancies in the knowledge of the peer as compared to 
the self; Aguiar et al., 2012). There were only two contexts in which 5-year-olds 
demonstrated an understanding of expertise and both of these were contexts that were not 
self-relevant. First, these children more frequently reported that the peers’ level of 
expertise was the cause of their superior performance when the peer was an expert rather 
than a novice.  Second, they differentiated their task difficulty ratings by peer expertise in 
a logical direction (i.e., believing that a task is easier when even a novice performed 
well). Thus, the demands imposed by self-relevant contexts may limit young children’s 
use of expertise information for self-evaluation.  
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 Unlike younger children, older children reported favorable performance 
perceptions in the context of expert rather than novice peer comparisons. This indicates 
that they recognize that failure relative to an expert is a poor indicator of their 
performance. As expected, ability evaluations were high regardless of peer expertise, 
suggesting that one instance of relative failure is not enough for even older children to 
make dispositional attributions about their level of ability (Ruble et al., 1980). Yet 
surprisingly, 8- and 10-year-olds’ feelings about their performance were very positive and 
did not vary by peer expertise. Evidence regarding the consistency of performance and 
affect ratings in response to social comparison is mixed (see Ruble et al., 1994). Thus, 
these two types of self-evaluations may sometimes hold different meanings for children. 
Expertise information may not have affected emotional reactions to relative failure 
because it is not highly evaluative (e.g., being a novice is not necessarily a negative 
characteristic, in contrast to incompetence; Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). Because expertise is 
conceptualized as malleable, this may diminish its evaluative nature. The emphasis on 
this characteristic may have partially alleviated older children’s tendency to interpret 
relative failure as due to stable differences in ability. Highly evaluative peer 
characteristics (e.g., ability related traits) that are frequently essentialized may evoke 
more robust emotional reactions. 
 One could argue that children’s task perceptions played a role in the 
developmental and domain effects documented in the current study. Specifically, 
differences in children’s consideration of feedback may stem from differences in their 
task experience. If 5-year-olds (in both domains) or 10-year-olds (in the novel domain) 
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perceived the task as particularly difficult, this could have influenced their self-
evaluations. This explanation is highly unlikely, as children’s perceptions of task 
difficulty did not differ by age or domain. However, other characteristics that were not 
assessed here may have played a role. For example, older children are more affected by 
comparative feedback in domains that they perceive to be of significant importance to 
themselves (Bers & Rodin, 1986). Eight-year-olds may have viewed drawing and the 
novel task as personally significant, resulting in the salience of comparative feedback in 
both domains. Ten-year-olds may have placed little value on the novel task, and thus 
perceived the comparative feedback as less important. 
A more likely explanation for 8- and 10-year-olds’ differential consideration of 
comparative feedback in a novel domain is that these differences reflect an emerging 
awareness that effort alone cannot overcome inherent limitations in ability (Folmer et al., 
2008). Eight-year-olds may have overestimated the effectiveness of their exerted effort in 
the novel domain, which made them vulnerable when it did not result in high 
performance (Lockhart, Keil, & Aw, 2013). Indeed, these children were uncertain about 
their ability to win a flerping competition regardless of peer expertise. Unrealistic 
perceptions of effort, coupled with relative failure, may result in tentative expectations of 
future performance.  
With age, children may have considered their previous effort and failures in 
drawing, which increased the salience of peer expertise in the familiar domain. Ten-year-
olds may have viewed feedback in a novel domain as undiagnostic given that they did not 
exert substantial effort to determine whether they could improve their performance. They 
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may have felt that it was possible to attain expertise at “flerping”, but were more certain 
that they were unable to attain expertise in drawing. Indeed, 10-year-olds were uncertain 
about their ability to win a drawing competition. In contrast, these children were more 
optimistic about their ability to win a “flerping” competition, at least when the peer was a 
novice. This interpretation is consistent with findings that older children report more 
favorable self-evaluations following relative failure when comparison peer status seems 
attainable (Buunk, Kuyper, van der Zee, 2005).  
In sum, sensitivity to comparative feedback and peer expertise increased with age, 
but the effects of peer expertise on older children’s self-evaluations were still limited. 
The current findings suggest that developmental change in children’s consideration of 
negative information (i.e., positivity bias) and self-relevant information affected 
children’s consideration of comparative feedback and peer expertise. Additionally, the 
limited effects of comparative feedback in later childhood suggest that conceptions of 
expertise as malleable partially alleviate perceptions that relative failure is due to stable 
differences in ability.  
Given young children’s disregard for peer expertise in the current study, it was 
expected that more essentialized ability information about a peer may be necessary to 
increase reflection on ability as a cause of relative failure. Additionally, such information 
may be necessary for older children to consider it relevant, rather than undiagnostic, for 
performance evaluations in a novel domain. This possibility was addressed in Experiment 
2 through the provision of peer ability related trait information. Traits are essentialized 
categories with associated properties (e.g., behaviors and intentions). Thus, a wealth of 
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conceptual information is conveyed in a single trait label (Gelman et al., 2007; Heyman 
& Gelman, 1999). Traits are also readily considered at an early age because reasoning 
about categorical information requires low processing demands (Heyman & Gelman, 
2000). Therefore, young children may consider trait labels more readily than expertise in 
a comparison context. Given that the majority of mixed findings in Experiment 1 were 
found in the novel domain, Experiment 2 only included a novel domain to examine these 
effects further. Further, the effects were examined in 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-
olds, as these are critical times for trait reasoning development (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 
2000).  
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to examine the effects of comparison peer traits on 
children’s self-evaluations. This investigation builds on Experiment 1 by examining how 
highly essentialized ability related traits, as opposed to non-essentialized expertise 
information, relate to children’s use of peer competence information in a social 
comparison setting. As discussed previously, theoretical views of social comparison 
development center on the idea that children’s reasoning about ability related traits 
underlies changes in responsiveness to social comparison (Butler, 1989). Yet, there has 
been little empirical work on the relevance of ability conceptions to comparative 
outcomes directly (Butler, 1992). This study is the first to examine systematically 
children’s use of peer trait labels in a social comparison context through the use of an 
experimental design. Ability related trait information should be influential to the 
interpretation of comparative feedback because it may increase reflection about ability as 
the cause of performance discrepancies. Thus, this investigation will inform our 
understanding of age-related change in ability conceptions as a mechanism of change in 
social comparison.   
Given the theoretical importance of ability conceptions for social comparison 
development, traits were expected to be relevant in a social comparison context. 
Generally, trait reasoning has implications for children’s beliefs about behaviors and 
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academic outcomes beginning early in life. By 5 years of age, children make trait 
attributions about others (Boseovski, Lapan, & Bosacki, 2013; Giles & Heyman, 2004; 
Lapan & Boseovski, 2016) and use trait information to inform their predictions of others’ 
future behaviors (Yuill & Pearson, 1998).  For example, children expect that a nice 
individual will engage in behaviors like sharing (Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). 
Likewise, they infer that an individual who shares is “nice” (Boseovski & Lee 2006, 
2008; Lapan, Boseovki, & Blincoe, 2016). Even preschoolers use explicit trait labels to 
make inferences about an individual’s emotional state (e.g., inferring that a “nice” child 
would be sadder than a “mean” child when their actions made someone else upset; 
Heyman & Gelman, 1999).  Children of this age also make distinctions between the 
behavioral correlates of a variety of traits (e.g., nice vs. mean vs. smart; Cain, Heyman, & 
Walker, 1997). 
Ability related traits (e.g., smart, athletic, artistic) are a specific subcategory of 
traits that are associated with expected performance outcomes (e.g., grades in school; 
Lockhart et al., 2013). Children’s reasoning about ability related traits has implications 
for academic self-perceptions (Mueller & Dweck, 1998) and beliefs about achievement 
(Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). By 5 years of age, the provision of ability 
related traits impacts children’s expectations of peers’ academic performance (Stipek & 
Daniels, 1990). For example, even kindergarteners expect that a “smart” peer will 
perform better on reading and spatial reasoning tasks than a “not smart” peer (Stipek & 
Daniels, 1990). Additionally, when asked what it means to be smart, children as young as 
5 years of age spontaneously refer to knowledge or achievement (Kurtz-Costes et al., 
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2005). Young children also demonstrate some understanding of the distinct behavioral 
correlates of ability-related traits and prosocial traits (e.g., “nice”). For instance, when 
asked to select peers to be on their team for an academic competition or be part of their 
play group, even kindergarteners selectively choose smart peers as teammates and nice 
peers as playmates (Droege & Stipek, 1993).  
It is clear that children demonstrate early precocity in ability related trait 
reasoning. However, young children also exhibit two limitations in trait reasoning that 
should be relevant to their ability (or willingness) to consider comparison peers’ traits. 
First, before middle childhood, children infrequently cite ability related traits 
spontaneously to explain academic outcomes. This limited use of traits to explain 
academic performance is purportedly related to children’s inferences that ability related 
traits are unstable over time and can change (e.g., Nicholls, 1978; Nicholls & Miller, 
1984; Stipek & MacIver, 1989). As discussed previously, there are notable 
developmental shifts in children’s tendency to essentialize ability related traits. As 
children age, they are less likely to believe that traits can change and tend to endorse 
essentialized trait beliefs (i.e., they perceive traits as fixed, stable, and uncontrollable; 
Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Further, ability related traits, such as smartness, are 
essentialized to a greater degree than other traits (e.g., niceness) by late childhood 
(Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Thus, perceptions of ability related traits as largely malleable 
in early childhood should limit their relevance for interpreting social comparative 
outcomes.  
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 Second, young children exhibit a positivity bias in their use of, and reasoning 
about, ability related traits. For example, the onset of the spontaneous use of trait 
explanations varies based on the outcome being explained. Spontaneous trait 
explanations of academic success (e.g., “because he’s smart”) emerge by 7 years of age, 
but not for academic failure until 10 years of age (Benenson & Dweck, 1986). Young 
children are also more likely than older children to perceive themselves as “smart” (e.g., 
Nicholls, 1979; Stipek & Tannatt, 1984) and predict that their future performance will be 
positive (Parsons & Ruble, 1977; Stipek, 1984; Stipek & Hoffman, 1980). This positivity 
bias also extends to children’s generalizations of traits. For example, 5-year-olds 
overgeneralize the significance of being smart to irrelevant domains and tasks (e.g., 
expect a smart child to be able to jump high), whereas 10-year-olds indicate that being 
smart is unrelated to athletic skill (Stipek & Daniels, 1990; Cain et al., 1997; Heyman et 
al., 2003; Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005; Saltz & Medow, 1971). Further, these instances of 
trait overgeneralization are greater for positive than negative traits (e.g., children are less 
likely to expect a “not smart” individual to also be “not athletic”; Heyman & Giles, 
2004). Thus, children may more readily consider comparison peers’ positive rather than 
negative ability related traits.  
In the current study, 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds were told that they 
were outperformed on a novel task by a peer with a positive or negative trait that was 
task-relevant (i.e., intelligence) or task-irrelevant (i.e., athleticism). Trait terms and 
related behavioral information (e.g., “does well in school) were supplied to support 
children’s consideration of such information in their self-evaluations. Additionally, 
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relevant and irrelevant traits were included to examine whether young children would 
more readily consider positive traits, regardless of relevance, in a comparison context. 
Piloting indicated that 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds perceived athleticism as 
relevant to performance on the ToH due to the motor element of the task (i.e., moving the 
discs). Thus, this task was replaced with the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices 
(RCPM), which does not involve a motor response. Additionally, children’s explanations 
of academic outcomes as due to ability related traits (i.e., entity reasoning) rather than 
malleable factors (incremental reasoning), were assessed. Because entity reasoning has 
implications for interpretations of failure (Dweck, 2003), and older children are more 
likely to hold entity beliefs (Heyman & Gelman, 2000), the provision of peer ability 
related traits should be particularly likely to influence social comparison outcomes in 
older children. 
Hypothesis 1: Concerning 5- to 6-year-olds, one possibility was that traits would 
have little impact on self-evaluations, as in Experiment 1, due to the noted 
positivity bias in young children’s ability related trait reasoning, as well as high 
perceptions of malleability. Yet, it was also possible that these children would be 
more sensitive to ability related trait labels than expertise cues, given the salience 
of trait labels in early childhood.  
Hypothesis 2: Nine- to 10-year-olds were expected to report lower affect and 
performance self-evaluations after being outperformed by a target with a relevant 
negative trait, but to be unaffected by peers labeled with irrelevant traits (i.e., 
athletic/not athletic).  
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Hypothesis 3: As in Experiment 1, ability evaluations were expected to remain 
high for children of all ages. 
Hypothesis 4: Individual differences in entity beliefs were expected to have 
implications for children’s interpretations of comparative feedback. Specifically, 
children who tend to endorse entity beliefs about ability may be particularly 
sensitive to comparative feedback and to the ability related traits of comparison 
peers. Thus, higher endorsement of entity beliefs was expected to be associated 
with more robust effects of comparative feedback.  
Method 
Participants. There were 50 5- to 6-year-olds (M = 72.4 months, SD = 7.4, 28 
males) and 48 9- to 10-year-olds (M = 119.9 months, SD = 6.9, 25 males). Demographic 
data indicated that 62.2% of participants were Caucasian, 19.4% African American, 
11.2% mixed races, and 2% Hispanic. Also, 5.1% of families chose not to report their 
race or ethnicity. Participants varied in socioeconomic backgrounds, reporting incomes 
from less than $20, 000 to over $90, 000. 
Materials. For the social comparison task, children completed the RCPM (Raven, 
Court, & Raven, 1995). The RCPM booklet is composed of 36 items. Each item consists 
of a pattern at the top of the page with a missing piece and six pieces to choose from to 
complete the pattern.  
Design and Procedure. A between-subjects design was used to assess the effects 
of age (5- to 6-year-olds vs. 9- to 10-year-olds), trait valence (positive vs. negative) and  
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trait relevance (relevant vs. irrelevant) on children’s self-evaluations. Children completed 
the Entity/Incremental task, followed by the social comparison task.   
Entity/incremental task. Children were asked two questions about academic 
success (self and other) and two questions about academic failure (self and other; adapted 
from Benenson & Dweck, 1986). For example, children were asked “Think of kids in 
your class who get a lot wrong on their schoolwork. Why do they get a lot wrong?” 
Process responses (e.g., “They try really hard”), which reflect incremental views of 
academic outcomes, were coded as 0. Ability responses (e.g., “They’re smart”), which 
reflect entity views of academic outcomes, were coded as 1 (see Appendix C for more 
examples). The number of Ability responses was summed across the four questions; thus, 
the possible range of scores was 0-4.  
Social comparison task. Children were shown the RCPM and told, “This is the 
Matrix game. On each page you’ll see a pattern with a missing piece, and you have to tell 
me which of the pieces at the bottom fills the missing piece.” Standard task procedures 
were followed (Raven et al., 1995), except that children were told that they would get 5 
minutes to complete as many items as possible. As in Experiment 1, children were 
actually given as much time as needed to complete the task. Responses were recorded 
and upon task completion, the experimenter told children, “Now I’ll put your answers 
and how long it took you to finish into the computer. Then, the computer will tell us how 
you did on the matrix game.” Children received feedback in the same manner as Study 1 
except for the peer characteristics provided. Half of the children heard about a peer with a 
positive trait and half heard about a peer with a negative trait.  The trait was either task-
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relevant (i.e., smart/not smart) or task-irrelevant (i.e., athletic/not athletic; see Appendix 
D). Children were asked a peer performance question based on condition. For example, in 
the positive, relevant condition they were asked “Did Lee get 11 stars because he is 
smart?”). Endorsements (i.e., “yes”) were coded as 1 and rejections (i.e., “no”) were 
coded as 0. Comprehension and self-evaluation questions were the same as those in 
Experiment 1. Reliability for self-evaluation explanations was high (kappas: .89-.95). 
Results 
All children in the sample answered all four comprehension questions correctly.  
Peer Performance Question. Descriptive data are presented in Table 1. T-tests 
against chance indicated that older children reliably endorsed “smart” as the cause of the 
peer’s performance (92%), p < .01, but none of the other traits (i.e., “not smart”, 
“athletic”, or “not athletic”). Conversely, younger children reliably endorsed “smart” 
(92%), p < .01, and “athletic” as the cause of the peer’s performance marginally more 
often than expected by chance (75%), p = .08, but did not do so for the negative traits 
(i.e., “not smart” and “not athletic”).  
Are Entity/Incremental Explanations Related to Children’s Self-
Evaluations? Correlational analyses indicated that ability (i.e., entity) explanations 
increased with age, r(96) = .28, p = .007. Younger children provided at least one ability 
explanation 12% of the time, whereas older children did so 33.4% of the time. The 
overall low frequency of ability responses made it inappropriate to examine possible 
interactions between entity beliefs and the comparison manipulation. Thus, this variable 
was not analyzed further.  
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Do Children’s Self-Evaluations Vary by Age, Trait Valence, and Trait 
Relevance? Self-evaluation measures were analyzed with a 2 (age: 5- to 6- year-olds vs. 
9- to 10-year-olds) x 2 (trait valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (trait relevance: relevant 
vs. irrelevant) between-subjects ANOVA. There were no significant effects or 
interactions involving gender; thus, it was excluded from final models. See Table 2 for 
descriptive data.   
Affect. There were significant main effects of age, F(1, 90) = 10.89, p = .001, ηp2 
= .11, and trait valence, F(1, 90) = 6.21, p = .02, ηp2 = .07, that were qualified by a 
significant interaction between age and trait valence, F(1, 90) = 11.17, p = .001, ηp2 = .11. 
Younger children’s affect ratings were relatively high and post-hoc independent samples 
t-tests indicated that they did not differ significantly when the peer was described with a 
positive trait (M = 14.76, SD = 4.24) as compared to a negative trait (M = 15.32, SD = 
2.84), t(47) = 0.55, p = .59. In contrast, older children reported lower affect ratings when 
the peer was described with a negative trait (M = 10.87, SD = 3.44) as opposed to a 
positive trait (M = 14.79, SD = 2.17), t(46) = -4.725, p < .001, irrespective of trait 
relevance (see Figure 2a). Older children’s affect in the positive condition did not differ 
significantly from younger children’s affect ratings in the positive, t(36) = -0.03, p = .97, 
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Figure 2a. Mean Affect Ratings by Age and Trait Valence. *p < .05
 
Figure 2b. Mean Performance Evaluations by Age and Trait Valence. *p < .05 
 
Figure 2b. Proportion of Positive Competition Predictions by Age and Trait Valence. *p 
< .05 
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or negative condition, t(44) = 0.73, p = .47. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant, ps > .05. 
Performance. Older children rated their performance as lower than younger 
children, F(1, 90) = 8.52, p = .004, ηp2 = .09. There was a significant interaction between 
age and trait valence, F(1, 90) = 3.94, p = .05, ηp2 = .04 (see Figure 2b). Younger 
children’s performance ratings were high and post-hoc independent samples t-tests 
indicated that they did not differ significantly when the peer was described with a 
positive trait (M = 7.76, SD = 2.24) as compared to a negative trait (M = 7.80, SD = 2.25), 
t(48) = 0.06, p = .95. Older children rated their performance more favorably when the 
peer was described with a positive trait (M = 7.42, SD = 0.97) as opposed to a negative 
trait (M = 6.04, SD = .91), t(44) = -5.05, p < .001. Older children’s performance ratings in 
the positive condition were high and did not differ significantly from younger children’s 
performance ratings in the positive, t(33) = 0.70, p = .48, or negative condition, t(32) = 
0.78, p = .44. No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .05. 
Ability. Ability ratings decreased with age, F(1, 90) = 19.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, 
but were relatively high (see Table 2). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant, ps > .05.   
Do Children’s Competition Predications Vary by Age, Trait Valence, and 
Trait Relevance? Children’s responses to the competition question were analyzed using 
a logistic regression. A model with age, trait valence, and trait relevance was used to 
predict competition predictions. Additional variables were added in blocks (i.e., all two-
way interactions, followed by the three-way interaction) and the likelihood ratio test was 
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used to determine whether they contributed significantly to the model (Kleinbaum & 
Klein, 2010). Addition of the two-way interactions made a marginally significant 
contribution to the model, ∆LR = 7.59, p = .06. The addition of the three-way interaction 
did not significantly improve the model, ∆LR = 2.27, p > .10. Thus, the best fitting model 
included age, valence, relevance, and all two way interactions (see Table 5). The overall 
regression model was marginally significant, χ2 = 11.61, p =.07, Nagelkerke R2 =.15. 
There was a significant interaction between age and valence as displayed in Figure 2c, β 
= 2.26, Wald χ2 = 6.29, p = .01. Chi-square analyses indicated that older children were 
more likely to indicate that they could win a competition when the peer possessed a 
positive rather than negative trait, χ2(1, N = 48) = 4.09, p < .05. Conversely, younger 
children’s responses did not differ significantly by valence, χ2(1, N = 50) = 2.38, p > .10.  
Older children’s responses did not differ significantly from chance in either 
condition, ps > .05. Younger children were more likely than expected by chance to 
indicate that they could win a competition when the peer possessed a negative trait, t(24) 
= 3.67, p = .001, whereas their responses did not significantly differ from chance when 
the peer possessed a positive trait, t(24) = 1.00, p = .33. 
Do Children’s Difficulty Ratings Vary by Age, Trait Valence, and Trait 
Relevance? There were no significant effects of any of the predictors on children’s 
ratings of task difficulty, ps > .05. Younger children (M = 4.86, SD = 3.55) and older 
children (M = 5.17, SD = 2.25) rated the task as moderately difficult.
 
Table 5 
Logistic Regression Models for Competition Predictions in Experiment 2 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
β SE Wald χ2 β SE Wald χ2 β SE Wald χ2 
Age  0.78 0.43 3.33† -0.48 0.75 0.41 -1.10 0.88 1.55 
Trait Valence -0.18 0.42 0.18 -0.82 0.75 1.19 -1.44 0.89 2.62 
Trait Relevance -0.30 0.42 0.51 -0.13 0.90 0.03 -0.76 0.89 0.74 
Age x Valence  2.26 0.89 6.29* 3.83 1.49 6.64** 
Age x Relevance  0.38 0.89 0.18 1.57 1.22 1.67 
Valence x Relevance  -0.84 0.90 0.87 0.41 1.23 0.11 
Age x Valence x Relevance   -2.80 2.15 2.15 
    
(Constant) 0.33 0.42  0.76 0.58  1.10 0.67  
Model χ2 4.03 11.61† 13.89* 
Nagelkerke R2 0.05 0.15 .18 
Change in LR  7.59† 2.27 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Do Children’s Self-Evaluation Explanations Vary by Age? Data for 
participants who responded “I don’t know” were not analyzed (affect: 10%, performance: 
5.1%, ability: 13.3%). See Table 6 for full descriptive data. Individual Chi-Square 
analyses for each type of explanation indicated that all types of explanations varied 
significantly by age: affect, χ2 (4, N = 88) = 28.71, p < .001; performance, χ2 (3, N = 93)
= 13.69, p =.003; ability, χ2 (3, N = 85) = 11.54, p =.01.  
Table 6 
Percentage of Each Explanation Type by Age and Evaluation Question in Experiment 2 
   Affect   
 Positive 
Performance 
Negative 
Performance 
Effort/Practice Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t 
Know 
Age        
5-6 24.0% 10.0% 20.0% 2.0% 32.0% 12.0% 
9-
10 
12.5% 60.4% 8.3% 2.1% 8.3% 8.3% 
   Performance   
 Positive 
Performance 
Negative 
Performance 
Effort/Practice Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t 
Know 
Age       
5-6 34.0 % 12.0% 26.0% 0% 24.0% 4.0% 
9-
10 
25.0% 43.8% 12.5% 0% 12.5% 6.3% 
   Ability   
 Practice Skill/Ability Enjoyment Miscellaneous Don’t 
Know 
Age      
5-6 40.0% 16.0% 10.0% 18.0% 16.0% 
9-
10 
14.6% 41.7% 12.5% 20.8% 10.4% 
 
 
55 
Affect. Younger children most frequently made miscellaneous responses (36.4%), 
or references to perceived positive performance (27.3%), and effort/practice (22.7%), 
whereas references to negative perceived performance (11.4%) and task enjoyment 
(2.3%) were relatively infrequent. Conversely, older children most frequently referenced 
their perceived negative performance (65.9%), whereas all other references were 
relatively infrequent: perceived positive performance (13.6%), effort/practice (9.1%), 
miscellaneous (9.1%), and enjoyment (2.3%).  
Performance. No child in the sample referenced enjoyment in their explanation of 
performance; thus, this category was not included in the following analyses. Younger 
children most frequently referenced perceived positive performance (35.4%), 
effort/practice (27.1%), and made miscellaneous responses (25%), whereas references to 
negative perceived performance (12.5%) were relatively infrequent. Conversely, older 
children most frequently referenced their perceived negative performance (46.7%) 
performance, and to a lesser degree, perceived positive performance (26.7%). 
Effort/practice (13.3%) and miscellaneous responses (13.3%) were relatively infrequent.  
Ability. Younger children most frequently referenced their effort/practice 
(47.6%), made miscellaneous responses (21.45), and referenced general skills/traits 
(19%). Enjoyment references were less frequent (11.9%). Older children most frequently 
referenced their general skills/traits (46.5%) and made miscellaneous responses (23.3%), 
whereas practice/effort (16.3%) and enjoyment (14%) explanations were less frequent.  
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Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1, younger children reported high self-evaluations and 
competition predictions regardless of comparison peer characteristics. Conversely, older 
children showed significant sensitivity to peer trait valence. These children’s affective 
ratings and performance evaluations were impaired when they were outperformed by 
peers with negative traits, but were high when they were outperformed by peers with 
positive traits. Older children were also more certain that they could win a competition 
when they were outperformed by peers with positive rather than negative traits. However, 
these children failed to use trait relevance to inform their self-evaluations or competition 
predictions.  
By late childhood, it is evident that peer traits have a substantial impact on 
children’s interpretations of relative failure and thereby, self-evaluations. The fact that 
upward comparisons had no effect on younger children’s self-evaluations likely reflects 
their interpretation of relative failure as stemming from temporary causes (Nicholls, 
1978). Indeed, younger children explained academic success and failure on the 
entity/incremental reasoning task largely in terms of malleable factors (e.g., effort). 
Although young children generally view traits as malleable, negative traits are expected 
to be particularly malleable (Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002). Thus, children’s disregard 
for comparison peer traits was likely driven by a disregard for negative trait information 
in particular, consistent with the positivity bias displayed at this age (Boseovski, 2010). 
Indeed, younger and older children reported similarly high self-evaluations when the peer 
was labeled with a positive trait.  
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It is also likely that younger children’s disregard for the traits of their comparison 
peers was due in part to their limited understanding of how these traits are relevant to task 
performance. Younger children’s frequent endorsement of athleticism as a cause of the 
peer’s performance supports this explanation. The current findings extend previous work 
(e.g., Rhodes & Brickman, 2008) by documenting that peers’ ability related traits appear 
to emerge as significant for self-evaluation later than more essentialized categories (e.g., 
gender; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009).  
Given the significance of comparison peer traits for older children’s self-
evaluations, it is important to consider how such traits were integrated into self-
evaluations. As expected, when older children were outperformed by peers with negative 
rather than positive traits, they reported less positive affect and lower performance 
ratings. As noted above, this finding is likely due to developmental changes in children’s 
conceptions of ability as fixed. Additionally, this finding demonstrates that the provision 
of ability related traits, which are often essentialized at this age, is more influential to 
interpretations of comparative feedback than the provision of more malleable ability 
characteristics (i.e., expertise).  
Unexpectedly, peer traits impacted self-evaluations even when they were 
irrelevant to the task (i.e., not athletic/athletic). In other contexts, older children typically 
recognize that athletic skill is unrelated to performance on cognitive tasks (e.g., Stipek & 
Daniels, 1990). However, in the current study, the fact that children were provided with 
trait information about the comparison peer may have prompted them to assume that this 
information must be relevant in some way. They may have relied on the trait valence 
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alone in an attempt to use this information. Yet, this explanation seems unlikely because 
these children did not use irrelevant trait information when reasoning about the cause of 
the peer’s performance. Specifically, they only reliably endorsed “smart” as the cause of 
the peer’s performance. 
A more likely explanation for older children’s neglect of trait relevance is that 
they exhibit a halo effect when reasoning about traits in a social comparison context. That 
is, children may have inferred that the peer’s possession of an irrelevant trait indicated 
that they also possessed other similarly valenced traits (Stipek & Daniels, 1990). For 
example, they may not have thought that athleticism per se caused the peer’s superior 
performance, but that an athletic peer is also likely to be smart. This demonstrates that 
even older children exhibit a positivity bias in reasoning about trait information in self-
relevant contexts. This explanation may account for the discrepancies between children’s 
use of irrelevant peer traits (i.e., athleticism) in their explanations of the peer’s 
performance versus their use in self-evaluation. Specifically, children only endorsed 
“smart” to explain peer performance, but viewed irrelevant traits as meaningful to their 
own performance. This explanation is consistent with previous findings that other aspects 
of trait reasoning are limited in self-evaluative contexts, particularly those that require 
children to reason about negative information. For example, children are better able to 
reason about negative covariation information when they must make attributions about 
others rather than the self (Schuster, Ruble, & Weinert, 1998).  
In sum, the current study extends and complements the findings of Experiment 1 
by documenting more robust effects of highly essentialized ability related traits on self-
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evaluations as compared to expertise. Additionally, the study further documents a robust 
positivity bias in young children’s reasoning about relative failure and ability related 
traits, as well as some evidence of a positivity bias in older children’s reasoning in a self-
evaluative context. These findings add to our knowledge of developmental change in 
interpretations of comparative feedback by documenting the importance of ability 
conceptualizations in reactions to relative failure.  
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current studies examined how peer competence cues– expertise and ability 
related traits – alter children’s reasoning about comparative feedback in early to late 
childhood. Overall, young children’s self-evaluations were highly positive and unaffected 
by comparative feedback (i.e., regardless of peer characteristics, young children reported 
positive affect and high performance perceptions). By late childhood, children’s self-
evaluations varied based on peers’ ability related traits and, in some cases, expertise. 
Across studies, younger and older children reported high ability evaluations despite 
relative failure.  
These studies uniquely document that with age, peer characteristics matter for 
children’s responses to relative failure. Moreover, children’s conceptions of ability are a 
key factor in the emergence of social comparative feedback as a tool for self-evaluation. 
Although there is currently no comprehensive developmental model of social 
comparison, the current findings can be interpreted in the context of relevant 
developmental theories of ability conceptions, reflection, and self-awareness. 
Additionally, the studies contribute to adult social comparison models by providing 
insight about mechanisms involved in the development of social comparison. Below, I 
discuss how extant theories and models are related to three main aspects of the findings: 
age-related change in the impact of peer characteristics, the limited effects of expertise as 
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compared to traits, and the overgeneralization of irrelevant traits in children’s self-
evaluations. 
Ability Conceptions as a Mechanism of Social Comparison Development 
The current studies make a novel contribution to the social comparison literature 
by providing insight into the role of ability conceptions in the development of social 
comparison. Although ability conceptions are thought to be important to the development 
of social comparison sensitivity (e.g., Butler, 1989), little research has actually addressed 
this hypothesis directly, particularly in early childhood. The current studies provide 
support for ability conceptions as a pivotal developmental factor in children’s emerging 
sensitivity to comparative feedback. Specifically, the studies suggest that the provision of 
expertise, as compared to ability related traits, likely cues reflection about different 
ability conceptions across early and middle childhood because of the differences in the 
extent to which these characteristics are essentialized. The provision of expertise 
information likely creates a context in which malleable ability interpretations are 
accessible (Lockhart et al., 2016), thereby limiting the effects of comparative feedback on 
younger and older children’s self-evaluations (e.g., inconsistent and less robust effects in 
Exp. 1 as compared to Exp. 2). Conversely, trait information may cue more malleable 
ability reasoning in younger children and essentialized ability reasoning in older children, 
as these are the predominant ways in which children view ability related traits at these 
ages (Gelman et al., 2007). Therefore, trait information results in more robust effects of 
comparative feedback than expertise for older, but not younger children’s self-
evaluations.  
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Children’s reliance on ability explanations of relative failure may be influenced 
by developments in executive functioning (e.g., inhibition and cognitive flexibility). 
According to the Hierarchical Competing Systems Model (HCSM), behavior is guided 
via two systems: the habit and representational systems (HCSM; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 
2009). The habit system relies largely on previous experience and typically guides 
behavior, unless it is overridden by the representational system, which largely relies on 
conscious reflection. When children have sufficient attention and cognitive control, 
environmental cues may evoke reflection and override prepotent responses. Initially, 
HCSM was used only to describe the development of executive functioning, but it has 
since been applied to the social domain (e.g., Richardson, Mulvey, & Killen, 2012). In a 
social context, reliance on familiar performance schemas may represent a habit-based 
response (e.g., attributions of ability as the cause of performance discrepancies). This 
habit may be overridden via the representational system that enables children to reflect on 
the available evidence (e.g., peer expertise) rather than responding impulsively. As 
executive control skills mature, children may be more likely to reflect on such evidence 
(Boseovski & Marcovitch, 2012). This may explain in part why older children, but not 
younger children, were sensitive to peer expertise and ability related traits.  
Given young children’s limited executive functioning skills, more elaborate or 
essentialized ability cues (e.g., gender) may be necessary to increase reflection on the 
ability schema in early childhood. Although no studies have examined this proposition 
directly, Heyman & Compton (2006) found that environmental cues (i.e., questioning 
children about task difficulty as a cause of relative failure) could alter even young 
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children’s reliance on effort versus ability schemas in reasoning about achievement. 
Similarly, the finding that gender information influenced preschoolers’ responses to 
social comparison suggests that highly essentialized environmental cues may elicit an 
ability schema in young children (Rhodes & Brickman, 2008). Indeed, children report 
coherent essentialist beliefs about gender (Taylor et al., 2009) earlier in life than they do 
for traits (Gelman, et al., 2007).  
Three main aspects of the current findings provide support for the proposition that 
ability conceptions underlie the development of social comparison. First, both studies 
document the emergence of comparative feedback as influential to social comparison 
between early and middle childhood. This converges with previous findings that 
conceptions of ability as fixed emerge between these same developmental periods 
(Nicholls, 1978). Second, participants in the current studies showed evidence of this same 
developmental shift in ability conceptions. Specifically, older children were more likely 
than younger children to provide ability explanations for real life academic outcomes 
(i.e., Entity/Incremental task), whereas younger children rarely provided such 
explanations. Although even older children provided fairly low rates of ability 
explanations for academic outcomes, the Entity/Incremental task only assesses one aspect 
of essentialism (i.e., malleability). Thus, the assessment of various essentialist beliefs 
(i.e., beliefs that ability related traits are innate, biologically based, and stable across 
time, Gelman, et al., 2007) would likely result in more robust evidence of essentialism in 
this age group.  
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 Third, the provision of expertise information as compared to ability related trait 
information not only affected self-evaluations differently, but also altered the types of 
explanations children provided. When expertise was made salient, younger and older 
children explained their own capabilities with explicit reference to ability (e.g., “I’m 
smart”) as well as effort (e.g., “I do them all the time”). Conversely, when trait 
information was provided, younger children largely explained their capabilities in terms 
of effort, whereas older children largely referred to ability. This provides evidence that 
expertise likely cued younger and older children to reflect on the importance of practice 
because it is not conceived of in an essentialist way. In contrast, the provision of 
essentialized ability related traits cued older children to reflect on the importance of 
inherent skill. Developmental changes in positivity and reflection on fixed ability are 
likely fostered by parents’ and teachers’ emphasis on personal growth in early childhood 
and relative performance in middle childhood (Cimpian, in press). 
The current findings can also inform the vast literature on theories of intelligence. 
Entity theories of intelligence (i.e., assumption that intelligence is fixed) promote the 
avoidance of challenges and possible failure (for review, see Yeager & Dweck, 2012). 
Conversely, incremental theories of intelligence (i.e., assumption that intelligence is 
something that can be developed over time) promote an appreciation of challenges as 
learning opportunities. Incremental theories are beneficial to academic outcomes, 
particularly in instances of academic failure (Blackwell et al., 2007). Encouragement of 
children to focus on the expertise of others, as opposed to their ability related traits, may 
foster incremental views. Further, the current findings suggest that incremental mindsets 
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serve to improve academic resilience in part by decreasing the negative impact of upward 
social comparisons.  
Expertise and Ability as Related Concepts  
The findings that expertise and ability related traits had some similar effects on 
children’s self-evaluations suggests that these two types of information are conceptually 
related. With age, the provision of characteristics that indicated low competence (i.e., 
novice status or negative traits) resulted in lower performance evaluations than the 
provision of high competence characteristics (i.e., expert status or positive traits), 
although this was limited to the familiar domain for 10-year-olds in Experiment 1. 
Further, children demonstrated similar age-related changes in their use of these 
characteristics to explain peer performance. Integration of these characteristics in a 
similar framework will require further inquiry into how children perceive expertise and 
ability related traits as related across development. Given the current findings and 
previous research, there are at least three ways that these characteristics are likely to be 
viewed as increasingly related between early and middle childhood.  
First, as children age, they may begin to appreciate ability as a causal factor in 
achieving expertise. Early in life, these two concepts are not likely well differentiated and 
effort is conceived of as the most important factor in obtaining either expertise or ability. 
As children age, they generally view high ability as an indicator that an individual needs 
less time and effort to achieve high performance on a particular task (Nicholls & Miller, 
1984). Thus, similar conceptions may develop for children’s beliefs about ability as 
influential to the mastery of specialized knowledge. For example, an individual with high 
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ability may be expected to gain expertise more quickly and with less effort than an 
individual with low ability. Although even young children use information about an 
individual’s traits to infer their areas of expertise (e.g., a smart individual is expected to 
have different knowledge than a nice individual; Danovitch & Keil, 2007), children’s 
beliefs about ability related traits as a causal factor in the attainment of expertise (e.g., 
expertise is achieved faster and/or with less effort when ability is high) have not been 
examined.  
Second, with age, children may be better able to make specific ability-to-expertise 
inferences (i.e., use ability related traits to make inferences about the type of expertise an 
individual may have). Given that ability related traits are increasingly essentialized with 
age (i.e., seen as biologically based, unchangeable, innate, and stable across time and 
situations), they may readily guide inferences about an individual’s mental states, 
including knowledge. Indeed, it is well documented that even 5-year-olds use traits 
readily to make inferences about emotions (Yuill & Pearson, 1998). Further, preschoolers 
sometimes attribute expertise based on irrelevant traits (e.g., expect a “nice” expert to 
know more than a “mean” expert; Landrum, Pflaum, & Mills, 2016). The few other 
studies that have assessed how children conceptualize ability related traits as relevant to 
expertise have largely focused on children’s beliefs about “smartness” (e.g., Danovitch & 
Keil, 2007). This particular ability related trait is broad and may be viewed as a domain 
general skill (i.e., intelligence may suggest that an individual has, or can obtain, expertise 
in a number of domains). With age, other ability related traits may be viewed as more 
closely related to specific areas of expertise (e.g., artistic individuals should be expected 
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to know a lot about drawing and painting, but not other domains). This proposition is 
likely given that in middle childhood, more narrow domains of expertise are understood 
(Keil et al., 2008) and trait distinctions also become more sophisticated (e.g., 
distinguishing smart and nice; Kurtz-Costes et al., 2005).  
Third, expertise-to-ability to inferences also likely improve with age, but may be 
more difficult than ability-to-expertise inferences because expertise is not essentialized 
like ability related traits. Thus, the provision of a trait label may make generalizations to 
expertise easier than the reverse. This process may be similar to children’s reasoning 
about the relations between behaviors and traits. Specifically, children more easily make 
trait-to-behavior inferences (e.g., infer that a nice individual will share) than behavior-to-
trait inferences (e.g., infer that an individual who shares is nice; Liu et al., 2007). It may 
also be appropriate to make expertise-to-ability inferences more cautiously than ability-
to-expertise inferences because, in reality, individuals could feasibly know a lot about a 
domain in which they have little skill (e.g., an art curator may know a lot about art history 
and techniques, but they may not be artistic). Thus, like behavior-to-trait inferences, 
children may require greater frequency information to make expertise-to-ability 
inferences (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). 
Relevance of Age-Related Change in Positivity for Social Comparison 
 A critical aspect of adult social comparison theories is perceived similarity. 
Specifically, an individual’s sense of similarity to a comparison other can serve as a 
trigger for assimilation (i.e., belief that one can attain another’s level of achievement), 
which results in positive, rather than negative, self-evaluations after relative failure 
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(Mussweiler 2003). Young children’s overly positive self-evaluations in the current 
study, regardless of peer characteristics, may suggest that such a process is not relevant to 
social comparison outcomes in early childhood. In these studies, peers were chosen as the 
comparison targets given their salience as a reference group in early as well as late 
childhood (e.g., school setting; Pomerantz et al., 1995). However, younger children still 
may not engage in similarity testing to the same extent as older children and adults. Thus, 
peer similarity, regardless of peer characteristics, would have little influence on self-
evaluations. It is possible that younger children generally believe that they can achieve 
what others have achieved regardless of perceived similarity.  
Younger children’s optimism may be influenced by their interactive experiences 
with others, which promote self-awareness and may inform how children respond to 
social comparison across development. Decety & Sommerville’s (2003) self-awareness 
model presents four discrete content areas of self-awareness (i.e., physical, capabilities, 
traits, and social roles). In each content area, interactions with others that promote 
reflection help to develop children’s distinct self-other representations. The model can be 
further specified to take into account the divergent developmental trajectories associated 
with each content area. For example, it is likely that young children’s interactions with 
others serve to promote reflection on variability in mental states (e.g., desires, beliefs; 
Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010), more often than capabilities (e.g., negative 
performance feedback; Stipek & MacIver, 1989). With age, interactions that emphasize 
differences in self-other capabilities may become more frequent. Peer comparisons may 
be one type of interaction that serves to inform self-awareness. Positivity and a lack of 
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reflection on similarity or dissimilarity is likely fostered by the ways in which parents and 
teachers emphasis personal growth rather than relative performance in early childhood 
(Boseovski, 2010; Cimpian, in press).  
As children age, an increased awareness of similarities with others, and 
differences from others, may in part underlie the emergence of sensitivity to comparison 
peer characteristics. Indeed, perceived similarity affects older children’s reasoning about 
peers in many contexts (e.g., desire for intergroup contact; Stathi, Cameron, Hartley, & 
Bradford, 2014). It is likely that assimilation toward the comparison peer played a role in 
the self-evaluations of older children. In particular, when comparison peers were labeled 
positively (i.e., high expertise or positive traits), older children’s self-evaluations were 
overwhelmingly positive and did not differ significantly from those of younger children. 
Older children may have more confidence that they can attain a peer’s level of success 
when the peer is said to possess desirable traits (e.g., smart and athletic), regardless of 
whether they are relevant to the task at hand, because they view these types of peers as 
similar to themselves. This is consistent with findings that other peer attributes that are 
related to perceived similarity, but not the performance domain (e.g., friendship status; 
Altermatt & Pomerantz, 2003), are linked to children’s academic evaluations. Trait labels 
may enhance similarity perceptions more than expertise because traits are easily 
accessible categories to which children are often told they belong (Schunk, 1994). This 
may account for why older children were more certain that they could win a competition  
when outperformed by peers with positive rather than negative traits, but this finding was  
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reversed in the context of peer expertise (i.e., children were more certain that they could 
win a competition when they were outperformed by a novice rather than an expert).  
Similarity may emerge as a salient cue in late childhood as children begin to 
experience more frequent critical performance feedback or engage in upward 
comparisons. These experiences may foster an awareness of distinctions between the self 
and others. In the current studies, older children’s self-evaluations were more consistently 
influenced by peer expertise in the familiar domain (i.e., drawing) than the novel domain 
(i.e., flerping). This may reflect greater distinction in self-other representations of their 
drawing abilities as a result of prior experiences (e.g., parental or peer criticism, upward 
comparisons with siblings or peers), thus leading to differentiated self-evaluations based 
on peer expertise. In contrast, children had no reference point or prior experience to 
inform their representations of “flerping” ability.  
Changes in socialization practices across early and middle childhood also likely 
lead to developmental differences in motivations in self-evaluative contexts. Indeed, there 
is evidence that younger children’s motivations in a social comparison setting center 
around learning about a task and improving performance, whereas older children focus 
on outperforming others (Feldman & Ruble, 1977). The age-related changes in these 
motivations occur at the same time that teachers’ achievement criteria also shift from a 
focus on self-improvement to meeting normative standards (Blumenfeld et al., 1983; 
Stipek & MacIver, 1989). Peer expertise and traits are likely viewed as irrelevant when 
an individual’s motivation is self-improvement, whereas these types of information are 
considered important for self-evaluation. Further research is necessary to establish the 
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contributions of the mechanisms discussed (e.g., executive function and socialized 
achievement motivations) toward the differential treatment of expertise and trait 
information in self-relevant contexts across development.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The current studies provide fruitful directions for research on children’s ability 
conceptions. Further work is necessary to establish how children perceive the relation 
between expertise and ability related traits. Future studies could address systematically 
children’s willingness to make ability related trait attributions when provided with 
expertise information (i.e., expertise-to-ability) and vice versa (i.e., ability-to-expertise). 
Additionally, further research is necessary to establish children’s beliefs about ability as a 
causal mechanism in the development of expertise. Specifically, this work could address 
whether children believe that individuals labeled with particular ability related traits (e.g., 
smart) would be able to master specific knowledge at faster rates and with fewer effort 
than individuals labeled with other traits (e.g., nice or artistic). The inclusion of relevant 
and irrelevant ability related traits would help to establish whether children view such 
traits as domain general skills as opposed to domain specific skills.  
The current studies also provide a number of avenues for future social comparison 
research, four of which are discussed below. First, additional research is needed to 
establish the role of ability conceptions in the development of social comparison. The 
degree to which individual differences in ability conceptions affected reactions to social 
comparison could not be examined in the current studies due to the small number of 
children that reported entity beliefs. This low response may reflect the fact that only one 
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aspect of essentialism was examined (i.e., malleability). Future research could examine 
how coherent essentialist beliefs about ability related traits may underlie children’s 
consideration of comparative feedback. Another possibility is to manipulate children’s 
ability beliefs to assess the systematic influence of ability conceptions on the use of 
comparative feedback. One promising way to manipulate ability beliefs is to adopt a 
paradigm used by Heyman & Compton (2006) in which they were able to elicit fixed 
ability conceptions in preschoolers. In this study, children were cued to reflect on ability 
as a fixed trait through the presentation of questions concerning whether performance 
discrepancies are due to task difficulty. If this procedure elicits fixed ability beliefs, then 
subsequent social comparison should be influential to self-evaluations even in young 
children.  
Second, it is important to identify which level of expertise (i.e., high vs. low) or 
trait type (i.e., positive vs. negative) accounts mainly for the current findings. The overall 
pattern of results, considered in the context of previous studies, seems to suggest that 
self-evaluations improve when peers are described with high expertise or positive traits 
(relative to unspecified peer characteristics). This is likely the case given that older 
children’s self-evaluations were as high as young children’s self-evaluations in these 
cases. Conversely, when peer characteristics are not described, older children report 
lower self-evaluations than younger children after relative failure (Ruble et al., 1994). It 
is also possible that failure relative to novices and peers with negative traits impairs self-
evaluations even further, but this cannot be determined from the current data because an  
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unspecified peer condition was not included. Thus, future studies should include such a 
condition.  
 Third, as discussed above, perceived similarity may play a role in children’s 
responses to relative failure, however this was not assessed directly in the current studies. 
Indeed, perceived similarity may account in part for the emergence of the effects of 
comparative feedback on self-evaluations. Thus, it is critical that future work directly 
assess children’s perceived similarity to comparison targets. Such an assessment would 
allow researchers to examine how perceived similarity may moderate the effects of 
comparison information on self-evaluations. Further, if perceived similarity is an 
underlying factor that drives the effects of social comparison in childhood, then peer 
characteristics may also be important for children’s responses to relative success. For 
example, if a child outperforms another peer whom they perceive as particularly similar 
to themselves, then they may form somewhat negative self-evaluations regardless of their 
superior performance.  
 Fourth, future research should assess whether domain significance underlies, in 
part, age-related change and individual differences in children’s reactions to comparative 
feedback, given that some of the current findings differed by domain (i.e., 10-year-olds’ 
disregard to feedback in the novel domain in Exp. 1). In particular, it may be important to 
examine children’s responses to social comparison in domains that are more significant to 
their daily lives. The current studies established that perceptions of task difficulty across 
were similar age groups, and thus could not explain developmental differences in 
children’s self-evaluations. However, children’s beliefs about the importance of different 
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tasks likely change across development. Younger children may need more relevant tasks 
that they view as important to consider comparative feedback. Perceived importance of a 
domain has been shown to affect older children’s, but not younger children’s, responses 
to social comparison (Bers & Rodin, 1986). However, few domains have  been examined. 
Perhaps younger children need feedback in more familiar and significant areas, such as 
writing their name or riding a bike. 
Given the pervasiveness of social comparison in the classroom (Frey & Ruble, 
1985) and Western culture at large, these results have practical implications for children’s 
daily lives. Although knowledge about one’s relative failure can sometimes be 
detrimental, it also provides the opportunity for children to identify areas that could be 
improved. Although not always the case, a major goal of social comparison is to 
determine accurate self-evaluations (Festinger, 1954). Therefore, it is critical to identify 
circumstances under which children are able to learn from negative feedback, rather than 
ignore it or respond helplessly. Further, it is important to establish how these 
circumstances may differ across development and across individuals. It may be 
particularly informative to investigate the role of learning orientations (Kamins & 
Dweck, 1999) and persistence (i.e., grit; Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007) 
in social comparison, and self-evaluation, in childhood. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the present research contributes to the current literature on the 
development of social comparison. In particular, the findings emphasize the complex role 
of comparative feedback as a means of self-evaluation across early and middle childhood. 
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Younger children maintain positive self-views despite relative failure, whereas older 
children consider who outperformed them. Age-related changes in positivity, as fostered 
by socialization practices, are likely relevant to ability conceptualization and thereby, 
resilience in relative failure situations. The current findings provide further evidence that 
ability conceptions are a mechanism of age-related change in reactions to social 
comparison. At a theoretical level, these results contribute to our understanding of how 
expertise and ability conceptions are related in early to middle childhood. From a 
practical standpoint, the findings could inform how parents and educators frame (or 
reframe) relative failure to focus older children on malleable causes of performance (e.g., 
expertise) and lessen detrimental effects on self-evaluations. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENT 1: PEER EXPERTISE INFORMATION 
Expert Novel Domain 
 “Casey is a boy your age. He goes to a school like yours and likes to play with his 
friends. He knows a lot about flerping. After school, he often takes special lessons 
on how to flerp. He knows how to flerp with lots of discs and posts. He flerps in 
front of lots of people. He has won competitions for his flerping.” 
 
Expert Familiar Domain 
 “Lee is a boy your age. He goes to a school like yours and likes to play with his 
friends. Lee knows a lot about drawing. He has taken the art class at school that 
all kids take, but also other special art classes outside of school. He knows how to 
draw lots of things. He shows his art to a lot of people. He has his won awards for 
his drawings.” 
 
Novice, Novel Domain 
 “Casey is a boy your age. He goes to a school like yours and likes to play with his 
friends. Casey doesn’t know a lot about flerping. When he came in to see us, he 
had never heard of flerping before and he had never tried flerping. It was the first 
time he ever flerped.” 
 
Novice Familiar Domain  
 “Lee is a boy your age. He goes to a school like yours and likes to play with his 
friends. Lee knows a little about drawing. He has taken the art class at school that 
all kids take, but no other special art classes outside of school. He knows how to 
draw a few things. He only shows his art to a few people. He’s never put his art in 
a competition to try and win a prize.” 
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APPENDIX B 
SELF-EVALUATION EXPLANATION CODING AND EXAMPLES  
(EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2) 
Affect & Performance 
Positive Performance: “I got a lot right” “I did a good job”  
Negative Performance: “I made a lot of mistakes” “I didn't think it turned but so 
well” 
Effort/Practice: “I tried my best” “I’ve never played flerping before” “I draw all 
the time” 
Enjoyment: “The game was fun” “I liked that game” 
Miscellaneous: “I got 9 stars” “I feel that’s where I belong” “I listened” 
Don’t know (not included in analyses): “I’m not sure” “I have no idea” 
 
Ability  
Practice: “I do them all the time” “I’m used to playing them a lot” 
General Skills/Abilities: “I’m smart” “I’m good at figuring out how to solve 
problems” “I'm not very good at drawing. It’s not my best strength” “I’m very 
good at drawing”  
Enjoyment: “I like puzzles” “I don't like art that much” “It’s fun to do”
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APPENDIX C 
ENTITY INCREMENTEAL CODING 
Questions 
1. Think of kids in your class who get a lot wrong on their schoolwork. Why do 
you think they get a lot wrong?  
2. Why do you think you get things on your schoolwork wrong? 
3. Think of kids in your class who get a lot right on their schoolwork. Why do you 
think they get a lot right?  
4. Why do you think you get things on your schoolwork right? 
 
Coding  
Process: “They pay attention.” “They study really hard.” “They don’t listen” 
“They’re not trying hard” 
Ability: “They are smart” “They are academically gifted” “They’re dumb or have 
a low IQ” 
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APPENDIX D 
PEER TRAIT DESCRIPTIONS IN EXPERIMENT 2 
Smart:  
 Casey is a boy your age. Casey is a smart boy. He knows lots of things and does 
 very well in school. 
Not smart:  
 Casey is a boy your age. Casey is not a smart boy. He doesn’t know very many 
 things and he does poorly in school 
Athletic:  
 Casey is a boy your age. Casey is an athletic boy. He is very good at running and 
 jumping and does very well at sports. 
Not athletic:  
 Casey is a boy your age. Casey is not an athletic boy. He isn’t very good at 
 running and jumping and does poorly at sports. 
 
